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Abstract
The three essays contained in this dissertation are about technology and inter-
national trade. The first essay examines optimal intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection in developing countries, while the other two estimate product quality at
the sectoral level for a panel of twelve manufacturing sectors in twenty OECD coun-
tries using a novel approach and relate import competition and R&D investment to
the growth of sectoral product quality.
Chapter 2 is motivated by the work of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), who argue
that the technologies developed in the North are not appropriate for the needs of
the South, due to a “technology-skill mismatch” problem. Chapter 2 tries to solve
this problem by putting forward a sector-differentiated IPR protection for develop-
ing countries. Specifically, in autarky, the IPR protection in the low-skill intensive
sector of the South should be greater than its high-skill intensive sector. However,
the greater protection for the low-skill intensive sector is not necessary when free
trade in the final good is allowed between the North and South. This implies that
international trade can help the South solve the technology-skill mismatch problem.
In Chapter 3, I estimate product quality at the sector level for twenty OECD
countries based on a gravity equation derived from a quality-heterogeneity model
of trade. I find that the estimated quality levels vary substantially across countries
and over time, and as in Hallak and Schott (2011), there is a positive correlation
between countries’ product quality and their per-capita income that is declining over
time. Lastly, the quality gap between rich and poor countries is more pronounced
in capital- and skill-intensive sectors.
ix
Using quality estimates from Chapter 3, the fourth chapter investigates the con-
tributions of import competition and R&D investment to the growth of sectoral
product quality. I find that import competition leads to substantial quality upgrad-
ing, confirming the findings of Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). I also find that both
R&D and human capital can facilitate quality upgrading by increasing the absorp-




This dissertation consists of three essays on technology, international trade and
economic development. The first paper investigates optimal intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection for developing countries in the process of economic devel-
opment, while the other two papers estimate sectoral product quality for a panel of
twelve manufacturing sectors in twenty OECD countries using a firm-heterogeneity
model of trade, and examine the contribution of import competition, domestic R&D
investment, and human capital to the growth of product quality at the sectoral level.
In the literature, one explanation for low income per capita in less-developed-
countries (LDC) is that the technologies they adopt from developed countries are
not appropriate for their needs. For instance, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) argue
that when the poor, low-skill intensive South imitates the technologies developed in
the rich, high-skill intensive North, the direction of innovation will depend on the
relative supply of skills in North, and consequently the low-skill abundant South
cannot fully benefit from the new technologies in North. This is a typical technology-
skill mismatch problem. An interesting question in this framework to ask is - is
it possible for the South to solve the technology-skill mismatch problem without
changing its factor supplies?
To this end, Chapter 2 extends the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model by introducing
a sector-specific IPR protection in South, and studies how such an extension can
change the direction of innovations in North towards the needs of South. Unlike the
Acemoglu and Zilibotti model, when innovators in North develop new technologies
in my model, they also consider the needs of South because the IPR protection laws
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set up by the Southern government allow the innovators in North to extract revenues
from South. The crucial point in my analysis is the possibility of sector-specific IPR
protection in South.
I show that in autarky the optimal IPR strategy for South requires stronger IPR
protection for the low-skill intensive sector. The intuition behind this result is simple
to follow: when the low-skill sector receives stronger IPR protection, innovators in
North will be induced to invent more low-skill technologies since there is a greater
market incentive. As a result, the technologies in North will better match the skill
endowment of South. I then analyze the same problem when North and South can
freely trade the output of the two sectors as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). I
show that in this case stronger IPR protection in the low-skill sector of South is not
necessary to change the direction of innovation in North. This implies that trade
can help South overcome the technology-skill mismatch problem.
One outcome of technical progress is improved product quality. Consequently,
product quality plays an important role in the study of international trade and
economic growth. However, due to a lack of data on reliable estimates of product
qualities, researchers usually use export prices as a proxy for product quality. As
indicated by Hallak and Schott (2011), this practice is inadequate because several
other factors (e.g., higher factor prices) can also lead to higher product prices. To
bridge this gap, Chapter 3 estimates product quality at the sectoral level using data
from a panel of twelve manufacturing sectors in twenty OECD countries during the
period 1995-2006.
The estimation procedure is as follows. I first use an extension of Baldwin and
Harrigan’s quality-heterogeneity model of trade as a starting point for my analy-
sis. This theoretical model leads to a gravity model similar to that in Helpman et
2
al. (2008). Finally, using the resulting gravity model, following Hallak and Schott
(2011), I identify product quality as an unexplained part of export value when trade
frictions, input costs, productivity, etc. are explicitly controlled.
My analysis yields several interesting results. First, I find that estimated quality
levels vary substantially across countries and over time. Second, as in Hallak and
Schott (2011), there is a positive correlation between countries’ product quality and
their per-capita income. However, because countries’ product quality is converging at
a higher rate than the convergence in national income, the correlation is weakening
over time. Last but not least, the quality gap between rich and poor countries is
more pronounced in capital- and skill-intensive sectors.
The study in Chapter 3 is different from two previous papers directly estimating
product qualities. In one paper, Khandelwal (2010) evaluates the quality of imported
goods in the U.S. using a nested Logit demand system, whereas in Chapter 3 I esti-
mate product quality at the sectoral level for different countries. In the other, Hallak
and Schott (2011) derive countries’ product quality from information contained in
their trade balances. They then estimate the U.S. trading partners’ relative manu-
facturing quality from 1989 to 2003. My analysis differs from theirs in the following
aspects. First, they estimate countries’ manufacturing quality, whereas I estimate
sectoral-level quality for two-digit manufacturing industries. Second, I extract prod-
uct qualities using a gravity model derived from a firm-heterogeneity model of trade.
Using quality estimates from Chapter 3, Chapter 4 investigates the effects of
import competition and domestic R&D investment on the upgrading of sectoral
product quality.
This is the second paper after the work of Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) to empir-
ically examine the impact of import competition on quality growth. Although we use
3
different methodologies and data sets, we arrive at the same conclusion - an increase
in import competition will force firms to upgrade their product quality in order to
cope with competition from abroad. Another finding is that new technologies spilled
from developed countries facilitate quality upgrading in developing countries, which
adds to the literature of technology spillover in economic development (see, e.g.,
Acharya and Keller (2008)).
Chapter 4 is the first attempt to empirically relate domestic R&D investment
to the growth of sectoral product quality. I find that both R&D investment and
human capital contribute to the growth of quality at a sectoral level by increasing
the absorptive capacity of developing countries, which is consistent with the findings
of Fisher-Vanden and Terry (2009).
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Chapter 2: Optimal IPR Protection,
Directed Imitation and Economic
Development
2.1 Introduction
Economists have offered several explanations for the difficulties some countries en-
counter in adopting new technologies. One explanation for low income per capita in
less-developed-countries (LDC) is that the technologies they adopt from advanced
countries are not appropriate for their needs. Basu and Weil (1998), for example,
emphasize the level of development in the technology adoption process, while Ace-
moglu and Zilibotti (2001) focus on the importance of the technology-skill mismatch
arising from the relative supplies of skills in less developed countries.1 More specifi-
cally, in the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model, technological innovation takes place in
the rich, skill-intensive North while the poor, low-skill intensive South gets access
to new technologies through costless imitation. Because innovators in the North
can only extract revenues from the domestic market, the direction of innovation
depends on the relative supply of skills in North, and thus the low-skill abundant
South cannot fully benefit from the new technologies in North.
An interesting question in this framework to ask is whether it is possible for South
to solve the technology-skill mismatch problem without changing its factor supplies.
To this end, this paper extends the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model by introducing
sector-specific intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in South, and studies
how such an extension can change the direction of innovations in North towards
1There are several other explanations of why the new technologies are not adopted by LDCs. Prente and Prescott
(1999), for example, analyze the effects of monopoly power on developing countries’ technology adoption where a
coalition of factor suppliers oppose the adoption of new and more efficient technologies.
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the needs of South. In my model, unlike the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model, when
innovators in North develop new technologies, they also consider the needs of South
because the IPR protection laws set up by the Southern government allow innovators
in North to extract revenues from South. The crucial point in my analysis is the
possibility of sector-specific IPR protection in South.
I first analyze this problem withinin a closed economy framework, where there is no
trade in goods. I show that in autarky the optimal IPR strategy for South requires
a stronger IPR protection for the low-skill intensive sector. The intuition behind
this result is simple to follow: when the low-skill intensive sector has stronger IPR
protection, innovators in North can extract more rent from the low-skill abundant
South. As a result, they can change the direction of their innovations towards South’s
needs. I then analyze the same problem when North and South freely trade the
output of the two sectors as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). I show that in this
case stronger IPR protection in the low-skill sector is not necessary to change the
direction of innovation in North. This implies that trade can help South overcome
the technology-skill mismatch.
The crucial assumption in my analysis is the existence of the sector-specific IPR
protection. How reasonable is this assumption? There are indeed several papers that
have documented that during the process of development the extent of IPR protec-
tion in different sectors can be quite different. Lo (2011), for example, finds that
prior 1986 patent protection in Taiwan only covered manufactured products and
manufacturing processes, while after patent reforms in 1986 it extended to chemical
and pharmaceutical products. Kumar (2003) documents that Japan’s patent pro-
tection had not covered pharmaceutical and chemical products until 1975, when its
6
technological capacity in these fields had grown strong enough.2 The most influen-
tial work in this area is by Lerner (2002) who provides information on the patent
systems for sixty countries with the highest GDPs in the world as of 1997. Each
country is reported at 25-year intervals during the period 1850-1999. The informa-
tion (which includes coverage, length, cost, limitations of patent protection, etc.)
he documents suggests that industries covered by patent law and the patent length
differ substantially across countries and over time.3
This paper is also related to a growing theoretical literature on optimal IPR in
economic growth and development. Chu et al. (2011) develop a model where do-
mestic innovation and imitation constitute two sources of economic growth. The
optimal arrangement involves weak IPR in the early stages of development to en-
courage imitation and strong IPR protection later on to stimulate innovation. Chen
and Puttitanun (2005) also notice a U-shaped IPR–development relationship. Kim,
Lee and Park (2006) propose a model wherein the “appropriate type” of IPR should
be different between the stages of development. However, these studies consider op-
timal IPR protection at a country level as opposed to a sectoral level as this paper
does.
There are two notable exceptions in the above literature. First, Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2006) develop a general equilibrium model in which optimal IPR protec-
tion that maximizes the growth rate involves greater protection for industries where
technology leaders are far ahead of their followers, and weaker protection for those
2Kumar (2003) also shows that the Indian government enacted new Patent Acts in 1970 to promote domestic
innovation by restricting patent protection in chemical and pharmaceuticals to processes only. The patent term was
also greatly shortened in these fields.
3The necessity of treating different sectors differently when protecting IPR has increasingly drawn economists’
attention. For example, Burk and Lemley (2009) argue that in the application of patent laws, the courts should
apply different standards to different industries to best satisfy their needs because the innovation pattern and the
way patents affect innovation are enormously different across industries.
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where innovators are close to each other in technology. In their model, optimal IPR
are based on the industry structure and technology gap within an industry, while
in this paper it depends on the relative factor endowment of South. Second, in a
recent paper, Chu (2009) studies the optimal patent breadth across sectors in a
quality-ladder economic growth model. Using simulation analysis, he finds that the
welfare improvement is substantial when transferring from an unvaried patent pro-
tection to a sector-differentiated one, even though the difference across sectors is only
moderate. His optimal patent design, however, depends on the size and technology
potential of the sector instead of the relative factor endowment in each sector. In
addition, his model is a closed-economy analysis whereas this paper considers the
case where the countries trade with each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the basic model.
Section 2.3 extends the model to international trade. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Setup of The Model
Consider a world of two countries (North and South) with two sectors whose out-
puts are imperfect substitutes with each other. Each country has a fixed supply of
skilled and unskilled labor. In the present setup, North represents a skill abundant,
developed country that develops new technologies through R&D, and South repre-
sents a labor abundant, less developed country that imitates technologies developed
in North. As in Acemoglu (2002), one sector uses skilled labor and a set of inter-
mediate goods to produce output, whereas the other sector uses unskilled labor and
another set of intermediate goods to produce output. The outputs of the two sectors
are then combined to produce the final good. The final good is either consumed,
invested, or used in innovation (in North) and imitation (in South). In this section,
I study the closed-economy equilibrium, and for notational simplicity, I drop the
country index whenever this does not cause any confusion.
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2.2.1 Preferences
Consumers in both countries have identical preferences and their utilities are
derived from consumption of the final good. The preferences of the representative





where ρ > 0 is the time-discount rate and Ct is the consumption at time t. The
utility maximization yields the well-known Euler equation
Ċt
Ct
= rt − ρ, (2)
where rt is the interest rate at time t.
2.2.2 Production
As indicated above, final good Y is produced from the output of the two sectors













where YL and YH denote the output of the low-skill and high-skill sectors, respec-
tively, and ε is the elasticity of substitution between the output of these sectors. I
assume that goods YL and YH are gross substitutes so that ε > 1.











where PL and PH are the corresponding prices of the low-skill and high-skill sectors.










In the subsequent analysis, I take the final good in North as a numeraire so that its
price equals one, PNY = 1.










where β ∈ (0, 1). Here xiv denotes the amount of intermediate good v used in
production of good Yi and Ni represents the mass of intermediate goods used in
sector i = H,L. I assume that these intermediate goods fully depreciate after their
use, as in Acemoglu (2002).
These goods are also produced in competitive markets. Using the production func-
tions in (6), profit maximization then implies that the demand for each intermediate














where piv denotes the rental price of intermediate good v in sector i = H,L.
Intermediate goods are produced by a set of monopolists, each choosing to pro-
duce a different variety. All monopolists in both sectors face the same production
technology: δ units of final good Y are required to produce one unit of each interme-
diate good. To simplify notation, without loss of generality, I assume that δ = β2.
Each monopolist faces the isoelastic demand function given by equation (7), and
profit maximization yields
pLv = pHv = βPY . (8)
With these price functions, the corresponding profits are given by














Thus, all intermediate goods producers in each sector make the same profit. In














From (4), (5), and (10), the relative price of output in each sector relates to the



























2.2.3 Innovation and Imitation
New products are invented in the R&D sector of North while South copies these
products with some costs. The product development process is similar to that in
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). The market for blueprints is competitive, and pro-
duction of a new blueprint in any sector requires µ units of the final good in North,
and thus
ṄNL = RL/µ, Ṅ
N
H = RH/µ, (12)
where superscript N represents North, and Ri is the amount of the final good Y used
in the process of product development in sector i = H,L. For the sake of notational
simplicity, I set µ = β(1− β).
Once a new intermediate good is developed, the firm that produces this new good
in sector i generates πNit profits in North in each period. In addition, South protects
the intellectual property rights of Northern firms in the process of imitation. More
specifically, the Southern government collects a faction κi of the profits of each
monopolist in sector i and transfers them to inventors in North.4 Denote with vit
4Other than the payment of royalty fee, in the literature, there are other measures associated with the protection
of IPR, for example, the regulation of band breadth for patents.
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Y ) = rtvit, (13)
where PNY /P
S
Y is the purchasing power parity (PPP) between North and South.
South gets access to new technologies only through a costly imitation.5 Imitation
of a new product from North requires τ units of final good Y S. Once the imitation
costs are paid, South has an access to the world technology frontiers; as a result,
NSL = N
N
L ≡ NL and NSH = NNH ≡ NH .
2.2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, I consider only the steady-state (balanced growth path) equilibrium
analysis where South imitates all available technologies in North. Since the R&D
sector in North is perfectly competitive, the equilibrium value of an intermediate
good must be equal to its development cost, i.e. vit = µ. Thus, the value of any






Y ) = rµ.
Substituting the profit functions from (9) into the latter and using PNY = 1 and

















HS = r. (14)
Consider the first equality in (14). Since P jL/P
j
Y for j = N,S decreases in NL/NH
as indicated in the first equation in (11), the left-hand-side (LHS) of this equality




Y is increasing in NL/NH , and
thus, the right-hand-side (RHS) of the first equality is also increasing in NL/NH .
5According to UNESCO (2010), in 2007, developed countries carried out over 76 percent of R&D in the world.
Although the role of innovation in explaining the catch-up phenomenon is analyzed in the literature, the innovation
activity in developing countries is mostly adaptive, imitative, and incremental (Kim et al., 2006). In a recent paper,
Madsen, Islam and Ang (2010) find that for OECD countries, R&D affects economic growth by innovation, while


















FIGURE 1: Closed-economy Equilibrium Interest Rate
These two curves uniquely intersect each other as depicted in Figure 1. Substituting
the equilibrium value of NL/NH into (14) yields a unique equilibrium interest rate
r. Since on the balanced growth path C, YL, and YH all grow at the same rate g,
equation (2) then yields a unique growth rate for each economy.
Note also that an increase in κL increases NL/NH , whereas an increase in κH
decreases NL/NH as shown in Figure 1. In either case, the interest rate r, and thus
the growth rate g increases. The intuition is simple: an increase in κi increases profits
obtained from sales in South, which will increase incentives for inventors in North
to develop more new products. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. For a given κL and κH in closed-economy equilibrium, both coun-
tries grow at the same unique rate. In addition, the growth rate increases in κH and
κL.
13
When there is no IPR protection in South (i.e., κL = κH = 0), using (4), (9),









Thus, as in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), the direction of the technical change
in North only depends on North’s relative labor supply. Thus, if South does not
implement any IPR protection, there will be a technology-skill mismatch in South
and consequently the aggregate TFP and income per capita in South will be lower
than in North (see Acemoglu, 2002 for more on this).
2.2.5 Optimal IPR Protection Policies in South
In this section, I investigate optimal IPR policies that can change the direction of
technical progress so that South can benefit more from the innovations developed
in North. To this end, I will first discuss the optimal (or ideal) NL/NH for South
that maximizes the welfare in South. I restrict my analysis to the steady-state case.
Along the BGP, the consumption CSt , investment I
S
t , and output Y
S
t grow at rate
g, which equals the growth rate of NL and NH . Using the utility function (1), the












addition, imitation of each new product requires South to pay τ units of the final
good. Since ṄLt = gNLt and ṄHt = gNHt, the cost of imitation at time t then is
τgNt, where Nt = NLt + NHt. Thus, C
S
t = (1 − β)Y St − τgNt. Substituting these
6To see this, note that from (7), (8) and (10), the (real) investment in each country is calculated as I =
(pLvxLvNL + pHvxHvNH)/PY = β(PLYL + PHYH)/PY . Due to perfect competition in the production of final




t for j = N,S.
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into the above utility function yields
Ut =






For a given value of g and Nt = NLt +NHt, what is the optimal level for NL/NH
that maximizes the welfare given by (16)? As shown in Appendix A, the optimal









A comparison of (15) and (17) reveals that, for South, the optimal ratio of technology
is based on South’s factor endowment, whereas the optimal ratio in North reflects
North’s relative factor endowment (assuming that North does not get any IPR
payments from South).
Proposition 2. Along the BGP, the optimal ratio of NL/NH for South is given by
(17). That is, at the optimal solution, South prefers the relative number of products
NL/NH to reflect its own relative factor endowment.
Although South does not innovate, it can change the direction of technology inno-
vation in North by designing an optimal intellectual property rights (IPR) protection
system, and thus giving North’s innovators a market incentive. How should South
design its IPR system to achieve the optimal ratio NL/NH in (17)? More specifically,
what values of κL and κH should South choose so that it can change the direction
of technical innovation for its own benefit?







H , i.e. the optimal ratio of technology in South is more low-skill
oriented than that chosen by North. As can be easily seen from Figure 1, inducing
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North to increase NL/NH requires South to increase κL and decrease κH . When
















LS = (PNH )
1
1−βHN − (PNL )
1
1−βLN (18)
At South’s optimal ratio of technology, the RHS of (18) is positive.8 It then follows
that κL > κH . In other words, to achieve the optimal technology ratio, South’s
IPR protection in the low-skill sector should be stronger than that in the high-skill
sector.
Before going further, it is important to emphasize that the implicit assumption
in the above result is that South is sufficiently low-skill labor abundant so that
the RHS of (18) is smaller than (P SL /P
S
Y )
1/(1−β)LS. Otherwise, κL − κH > 1, which
contradicts with κi ∈ [0, 1] and κL − κH ∈ (0, 1]. In addition, equation (18) implies
that as South gets more low-skill abundant (i.e., as LS increases), the difference
between κL and κH reduces.
Proposition 3. To achieve the optimal ratio of technology, unskilled-labor abundant
South should implement an IPR system in which the IPR protection in the low-skill
sector is greater than that in the high-skill sector (i.e., κL > κH).
2.3 International Trade
In the previous section, I analyzed the closed-economy equilibrium for each country,
and showed that when (unskilled) labor abundant South implements an IPR policy
7This is shown in Appendix A.







1−βHN = (PNL )
1
1−β LN . Using (11) and PNY = 1, P
N
H is an increasing function in
NL/NH , while P
N



















in which the unskilled labor intensive sector gets more protection, South can change
the direction of technical change for its own benefits. In this section, I extend this
model by allowing free trade in two sectors’ outputs YL and YH between North
and South, and investigate optimal IPR protection policies in South. I assume that
trade is balanced. In addition, to avoid the situation where firms in South copy the
products developed in North, and sell them back to North at lower prices, following
much of the literature (e.g., Gancia and Bonfiglioli (2008)), I assume that there is
no trade in intermediate goods.
Before going further, it is worth noting how opportunity to trade arises in the










, j = S,N.
Since South is labor intensive (i.e., LS/HS > LN/HN), it then follows that the









Thus, under the free-trade South exports the labor-intensive good YL and imports
skill-intensive good YH .
Let PWi for i = H,L denote the price of good i in the world market. Equation (5)
then ensures that the price of the final good Y is also the same across countries, i.e.
PNY = P
S
Y ≡ PWY . I continue to take the final good Y as numeraire so that PWY = 1.





Y NL + Y
S
L






where Y ji denotes the total output produced in sector i = H,L in country j = N,S.
Substituting output levels from (10) with P ji = P
W
i into the above equation and
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2.3.1 No IPR Protection in South under Free Trade
In this section, I study the implications of no IPR protection in South under free
trade. Note that equation (14) still holds under free trade, except now P ji is replaced









note that this relative price is identical to the autarkic relative price in North.
Thus, when South does not implement any IPR protection policies, after trade
liberalization the relative world price of the labor-intensive good YL will be equal to
the autarkic relative price of this good in North.












Since South is labor abundant (i.e., LS/HS > LN/HN), the first term on the RHS is
less than one. Thus, a comparison of (22) to (15) indicates that the relative number
of intermediate goods NL/NH under the free trade is smaller than that in autarky. In
other words, under free trade, when South does not implement any IPR protection
policy, the direction of technical change in North will be more high-skill intensive
than that in autarky.
Proposition 4. If South implements no IPR protection, under free trade, the in-
novation in North will be more high-skill oriented than that in autarky.
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The intuition behind the above result is as follows. Given that the relative price
does not change in North after opening to trade, North has to produce more high-
skill products and export them to South to balance the import of low-skill goods
from South, which requires the South to invent more high-skill intermediate goods.
The result presented in Proposition 3 is similar to Gancia and Bonfiglioli (2008),
who consider a North-South trade model where North completely specializes in pro-
duction of skill-intensive goods, whereas South completely specializes in production
of labor-intensive goods. In my model, however, there is no complete specialization.
2.3.2 Optimal IPR Protection under Free Trade
I now turn to study the optimal IPR protection policies in South under free trade.
As in the closed-economy case, the optimal ratio of technology, NSL/N
S
H , in South is
again determined by maximizing the welfare function (16). Substituting the solution
back into (20) yields South’s “desired” relative world price, PWL /P
W
H . The following
lemma characterizes the desired relative world price for South (see Appendix B for
the proof).































Since LS/HS > LN/HN , it then follows that (LS + LN)/(HS + HN) > LN/HN .
The above lemma then implies that PWL /P
W
H < (L


















1−βLS > (PWH )
1
1−βHS (see Lemma 1), the inequality (24) always holds
whenever κL > κH . In other words, κL > κH is a sufficient (but not necessary) con-
dition to make the inequality in (24) hold. Consequently, unlike the closed-economy
case, under free trade, South’s optimal IPR protection for the low-skill sector may
not need to exceed that for its high-skill sector.
To understand under what conditions κH may exceed κL, Figure 2 represents the
equilibrium condition (23). The steeper line represents the LHS of equation (23).
The two curves intersect each other at point A where κL = κH = κ
∗. When interest
rate lower than r∗, it is necessary that κ∗ > κL > κH to keep the equilibrium
condition (23). On the other hand, when interest rate is higher than r∗ (and thus,
the economy grows at a faster rate), it then follows that κ∗ < κL < κH . Thus,
when both sectors in South have weak IPR protections, the low-skill sector should
receive relatively stronger IPR protection; whereas when both sectors have strong
IPR protections, the IPR protection for the high-skill sector should be stronger.
The intuition is as follows. When South implements no IPR protection, the relative
world price is the same as North’s relative price in autarky, which is greater than
South’s desired relative world price. Then to induce North to invent more low-skill
technologies and thus lower the relative world price, South first sets up IPR laws
with stronger protection for its low-skill sector (such that κ2L > κ
2
H in Figure 2).
Using (9), (PWL )
1
1−βLS > (PWH )
1
1−βHS implies that the profit of intermediate-good
producers in South’s exporting, low-skill sector is greater than that in its high-skill
sector. Then when the South strengthens its IPR protection, the market incentive























FIGURE 2: Optimal κL and κH under Free Trade
the same rate. Consequently, to balance the incentive for both types of innovators
and fix the technology ratio NL/NH at the desired level, κH has to increase at a




H in Figure 2).
Proposition 5. Under free trade, the optimal IPR protection policy in South does
not necessarily require stronger IPR protection for the low-skill intensive sector.
More precisely, when the IPR protections are weak in both sectors, South should
have relatively stronger IPR protection in low-skill intensive sector (i.e., κL > κH);
when the IPR protections are strong in both sectors, South should have relatively
stronger IPR protection in the high-skill intensive sector (i.e., κH > κL).
2.3.3 Further Discussion
The model presented in the previous sections has considered a world of two regions:
North and South. North represents developed countries, whereas South represents
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the less developed countries (LDCs). But developing countries differ in many di-
mensions such as factor endowments and size. Consequently, NL/NH for South as
a whole may not be optimal for some LDCs in the South. In this section, I demon-
strate that for some small-size LDCs whose relative supply of skilled labor is different
from South’s, it is still possible for them to improve their welfare by adopting only
a subset of technologies developed in North.
To this end, following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), I assume that the cost of
imitation in sector i = H,L in country j of South is given by τ(N ji /N
N
i )
ξ where ξ > 0
is an exogenous constant. Using (10) implies that under free-trade, the marginal
contribution to GDP of adopting one new technology in each sector is given by
(PWL )
1
1−βLj and (PWH )
1
1−βHj.9 Thus, along the BGP, LDCs in South should ensure
that the imitation cost of the last adopted technology is no greater than its marginal






















H . (25) indicates that small countries (with small
Lj and Hj) are more likely to meet the constraint and adopt only a subset of the
available technologies.
In addition, when adopting only part of North’s technologies, LDCs with a rela-
tively more low-skill (high-skill) intensive labor supply should adopt a bigger fraction
of North’s low-skill (high-skill) technologies. To prove this, consider a LDC with such
a high-skill intensive labor structure that (PWL )
1
1−βLj < (PWH )
1
1−βHj. Suppose that
9I implicitly assume that the impact of adopting one new blueprint on the world price is negligible.
10Lin and Zhang (2006) also study the selection of technologies, but they do not discuss government policies to
achieve the selection. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) analyze the importance of selection of high-ability
managers and good firms when the economy is approaching the technology frontier, while this paper discusses
selecting a subset of technologies from North.
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the size of the country is so small that it meets some constraint in (25). If only the
first constraint is met, then the country will adopt part of low-skill technologies in
North, while it adopts all available high-skill technologies.11 If the country is small
enough in that both constraints are met, then dividing the left equation by the right






H . Only by adopting a bigger fraction of high-skill tech-
nologies in North could the country achieve this. Note that in doing so, the adopted
technology ratio of the country is more close to its own optimal ratio of technology.
However, firms do not coordinate their actions to determine the appropriate num-
ber of technologies. It is possible that the present value of profits from selling in-
termediate goods can exceed the imitation cost, while the latter is greater than the
marginal contribution of adopting a new technology to GDP. It then follows that
firms will adopt the new technology, but it is not worthwhile for the economy. In this
case, government can provide subsidies to induce firms to adopt the right numbers






, i = L,H,
where Si is the subsidy for adopting one new technology in sector i = L,H, and
α = [1− β(1− β)(1− κi)/r].12 So the subsidy is a fraction α of the technology
adoption cost (or imitation cost).
















, i.e. when subsidies are provided, for each firm
the present value of profits (after paying the royalties) from selling intermediate
11It is impossible that the second constraint is met while the first is not, since (PWL )
1
1−β Lj < (PWH )
1
1−βHj .
12If α turns to be negative, then the policy of interest is actually a tax upon the technology adoption.
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. Obviously, adopting more technologies beyond
that point is not desired either by the government or firms.
2.4 Conclusion
It is well-known that intellectual property rights protection can stimulate R&D
activities and technological progress. However, the role of IPR protection in changing
the “direction” of R&D and innovation is rarely analyzed. Built on Acemoglu (2002),
this paper studies the optimal IPR protection policies in South, which can “induce”
the direction of innovation in North towards South’s needs, and thus increase South’s
income per capita.
The optimal IPR protection in South is a sector-specific one. In autarky, South’s
low-skill intensive sector should receive stronger IPR protection while protection
for the high-skill intensive sector ought to be relatively weaker. Under free trade,
however, the paper shows that the IPR protection in South’s low-skill intensive
sector does not necessarily exceed that in the high-skill sector. Specifically, when the
IPR protection is relatively low in each sector, the low-skill sector in South should
receive greater protection, whereas in the case that the IPR protection is relatively
high in both sectors, the IPR protection for the high-skill sector should be more
stressed. The paper also shows that when the countries in South are heterogeneous
with respect to their factor endowments, the optimal ratio of technology for South
as a whole may not be optimal for individual countries. Nevertheless, they can still
improve their situations by adopting only subset of the available technologies.
In this paper, the invention is only supposed to happen in North, while South
accesses to the new technologies by imitation. Although this assumption is mostly
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consistent with observed data, the R&D activities in some developing countries,
such as China and India, have recently been booming. Thus, extending the present
model by allowing South to conduct its own R&D is an interesting avenue for future
research.
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Chapter 3: Estimating Sectoral Product
Quality Under Quality Heterogeneity
3.1 Introduction
Product quality plays an important role in the study of international trade and
economic growth.13 Due to a lack of data on reliable estimates of product qualities,
researchers usually use export prices as a proxy of product quality. However, as
indicated by Hallak and Schott (2011), this practice is inadequate because several
other factors (e.g. higher factor prices) can also lead to higher product price.
In this paper, I estimate product quality at the sectoral level using data from a
panel of twelve manufacturing sectors in twenty OECD countries between 1995 and
2006. I use an extension of Baldwin and Harrigan’s (2011) “quality heterogeneous-
firms trade” model as a starting point for my analysis; this theoretical model leads
to a gravity model similar to that in Helpman et al. (2008). Using the resulting
gravity model, following Hallak and Schott (2011), I identify product quality as an
unexplained part of export value when trade frictions, input costs, productivity, etc.
are explicitly controlled. To consistently estimate the gravity model, I follow the two-
stage approach of Helpman et al. (2008). Specifically, in the first stage, I estimate a
Probit equation for selection into trade partners, and in the second stage, I estimate
the resulting gravity model using predicted components from the first stage. The
main advantage of their approach is that it corrects the bias caused by selection into
trade, when the zero trade phenomenon is not negligible among country pairs.14
13Linder (1961) is the first to have conjectured that consumers in rich countries spend a larger portion of their
income on high quality products; the strong demand by consumers, in turn, induces these countries to develop
a comparative advantage in high quality products. Consequently, product quality plays a key role in determining
trade flows among high-income countries. The relationship between product quality and trade is then theoretically
exploited by Flam and Helpman (1987), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and Gervais (2012), among others, and recent
empirical studies have indeed documented the strong positive relationship between per capita income and product
quality (see, e.g., Schott (2004), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Hallak (2006) and Choi et al. (2009)).
14This is a typical sample selection problem which was first stated by Heckman (1979).
26
My analysis yields several interesting results. First, I find that estimated quality
levels vary substantially across countries and over time. For instance, in 2006, Italy,
France and Spain took the first three places in the rank of overall product quality,
whereas Slovenia, Finland and Slovak Republic were the countries with the least
overall product quality. As to the change of quality, Czech Republic and Greece
underwent the greatest rise in their overall product quality, from 17th and 18th in
1995, respectively, rising to 11th and 12th in 2006. On the other hand, the biggest
fall of ranking in the overall product quality happened in Austria, with its rank of
7th plummeting to 15th in 2006.
Second, as in Hallak and Schott (2011), there is a positive correlation between
product quality and per-capita income. However, because countries’ product quality
is converging at a higher rate than the convergence in national income, the corre-
lation is weakening over time. Last but not least, the quality gap between rich and
poor countries is more pronounced in capital- and skill-intensive sectors.
This paper is related to a large literature on firm heterogeneity and international
trade.15 On the theoretical side, my model is a multi-sector extension of Baldwin
and Harrigan’s (2011) model where consumers care about quality, and higher quality
goods are more expensive to produce. As in Melitz’s (2003) model, trade involves
both fixed and variable costs. Existence of fixed foreign-market entry costs parti-
tions firms into exporters and non-exporters, and only firms producing high quality
products can export. The latter prediction implies that it is possible that no firms
in a sector of a given country find it profitable to export. Consequently, the model
predicts zero trade flows between some country pairs, which is consistent with data.
15See, e.g., Melitz and Redding (2012) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
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Ignoring these country pairs during estimation will lead to a serious selection bias
problem.
On the empirical side, my paper is more closely related to Helpman et al. (2008)
and Hallak and Schott (2011). Helpman et al. (2008) develop a firm-heterogeneity
model of international trade where firms vary in their productivity, and due to fixed
and variable costs of exporting, only more productive firms export as in the Melitz
model. Consistent with data, their model predicts zero trade flows in either direction
between some country pairs. In addition, their model leads to a gravity equation
that they consistently estimate using a two-stage estimation procedure. My paper
complements their seminal work in several important ways. First, in their model
firms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity, whereas in my model
firms are heterogeneous with respect to their product quality as well as productivity.
Second, their analysis is at the country level and they estimate the gravity equation
using trade data from 1986; whereas my analysis is at the sectoral level and I estimate
the gravity equation for each sector in each year over the period 1995–2006. Finally,
unlike their model, I explicitly take into account the heteroscedasticity in trade
volumes using the FGLS method in estimation. This correction is important, as
Flam and Nordstrom (2011) demonstrate when estimating a gravity model; the
problem caused by heteroscedasticity in trade data can be even more severe than
the biases caused by selection into trade and firms’ heterogeneity.
In an influential study, Hallak and Schott (2011) derive countries’ product quality
from information contained in their trade balances. They then estimate the U.S.
trading partners’ relative manufacturing quality from 1989 to 2003 and find that
unit value ratios cannot be a good proxy for relative quality differences and con-
vergence in countries’ quality is more rapid than convergence of their income. My
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analysis differs from their work in two important ways. First, they estimate coun-
tries’ manufacturing quality, whereas I estimate sectoral-level quality for two-digit
manufacturing industries. Second, I extract product qualities using a gravity model
which is derived from a firm-heterogeneity model of trade.
This paper is also related to a strand of literature that evaluates the growth of
quality. For instance, Bils and Klenow (2001) quantify annual growth of quality
of goods in US using estimated “quality Engel curves.” Bils (2004) derives quality
growth of durables from CPI data by studying consumers’ behavior when they shift
from old products to new substitutes. However, they do not provide estimates of
product quality for different countries and sectors across years. My analysis differs
from these papers by directly estimating product quality. In another related study,
Khandelwal (2010) evaluates the quality of imported goods in the U.S. using a nested
logit demand system. In this paper, I estimate product quality at the sectoral level
for different countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical
model that motivates my empirical analysis. Section 3.3 derives a gravity equation
and discusses issues necessary to consistently estimate the gravity equation. Section
3.4 describes the data used in the analysis. In Section 3.5, I estimate the gravity
model and extract countries’ sectoral quality indexes. Section 3.6 presents additional
results for robustness checks and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I present the basic elements of the model regarding consumer
preferences, production, and firm entry decisions to export markets. I consider a
world of J countries (indexed by i or j) and S sectors (indexed by s). Each sector
(industry) is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous firms, each producing a
29
single variety of differentiated product. Capital and labor are the only factors of
production. When incorporating product quality into preferences and production, I
closely follow the model of Baldwin and Harrigan (2011).
3.2.1 Preferences
The preferences of a representative agent in country i are described by the following
two-tier utility function where the upper tier is Cobb-Douglas and the lower tier is












where ηis ∈ (0, 1) with
∑
s ηis = 1, and αs ∈ (0, 1). The variable Vis represents the
set of available varieties in sector s of country i, q(v) is the quantity consumed of
variety v, and λ(v) is the quality of variety v. The elasticity of substitution between
varieties in sector s is given by εs = 1/(1− αs), which is the same across countries.
Consumers spending an amount Ei maximize their instantaneous utility by allo-
cating Eis = ηisEi amounts on goods produced in sector s. It is well-known that







where Pis is the quality-adjusted aggregate price index associated with the consump-












3.2.2 Production and Trade
Differentiated products are produced by a continuum of monopolists, each produc-
ing a particular variety. Capital and labor are the factors of production and their
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intensity of use varies across sectors. More specifically, the cost of producing one
unit of product with quality λ is given by16
Cis(λ) = λ





where a ∈ (0, 1) is a constant parameter, Ais represents sector-level productivity;
ri and wi are rental price of capital and wage rate, respectively, in country i; and
βs ∈ (0, 1) represents the share of capital in production. Consistent with many
empirical studies, according to (29), marginal cost of production increases with
product quality (Verhoogen, 2008; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011), and decreases with
sectoral productivity Ais.
Following Helpman et al. (2008), I assume that production involves no fixed over-
head cost. However, firms wishing to export to country j face a fixed exporting cost
cisfij, where cis is given by (29). In addition, each exporting firm also faces variable
trade costs, which take the standard iceberg form: τijs units of good must be shipped
from country i in order for 1 unit to arrive at country j. Fixed exporting cost cisfij
ensures that only a fraction of firms will participate in trade.
Each firm faces a demand curve described in (27), and maximizing profits in each









where pijs represents the price of good in foreign market j, and cis is given by (29).
The demand function (27) and the above pricing rules imply that profits obtained
16Specification (29) is similar to that in Dinopoulos and Unel (2011) and Dinopoulos and Unel (2013).
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A firm with product quality λ from country i exports to country j if πijs(λ) > 0.
Existence of the fixed cost cisfij ensures that there exists a quality cutoff level λ
∗
ijs
such that only firms with λ > λ∗ijs export to country j.
I now address bilateral trade volume. To compute trade volumes, it is necessary
to first specify the distribution of quality levels. I assume that λ ∼ λisν, where λis is
an exogenous constant and ν is a random variable drawn from a Pareto distribution,
truncated over the support [νsL, 1]. Specifically, the cumulative distribution function





where ks is the shape parameter of the distribution. I assume that ks > εs − 1 so
that the integrals converge. In addition, I assume that the c.d.f. is sector-specific and
time-invariant. According to this formulation, λis is the maximum quality level that
a product within sector s can have. Obviously, for each quality cutoff λ∗ijs there exists
a unique ν∗ijs such that all firms with ν > ν
∗











Using the demand function (27) and pricing rule in (30) implies that the (f.o.b)









and integrating (34) across all exporting firms in sector s implies that the value of









where Nis is the mass of products produced in sector s of country i and Vijs is given













where Hs = ks/[((1− a)(εs − 1) + ks)(1− νkssL)] > 0 is a sector-specific constant.
3.3 Empirical Specification
In this section, I describe in detail how to consistently estimate equation (35).
Specifically, I will use the two-step approach of Helpman et al. (2008), then introduce
the method for evaluating countries’ sectoral product quality.
3.3.1 Parameter Estimation
Taking the logarithm on both sides of (35), the export volume from country i to
j in sector s can be expressed as
ln(EXijs) = θ0 + θi + θj − εs ln τijs + ψijs, (36)
where θ0 = lnHs + (εs − 1)lnαs is a constant term; θi = (1 − εs)(ln cis − lnAis) +
(εs − 1)(1 − a) lnλis + lnNis is a fixed effect for the exporting country; θj =
(εs − 1) lnPjs + lnEjs is a fixed effect for the importing country; and ψijs =
ln[1− (ν∗ijs)(1−a)(εs−1)+ks ]. In specification (36), τijs refers to variable trade costs, and







ijs − uijs, where {Dnijs} is a set of continuous trade im-
pediments between country i and j, such as distance and tariff. {Bmijs} is a set of
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dichotomous trade barriers, including common border, common language, common
legal origin, the same colonial history, etc. Substituting this into (36) yields










ijs + ψijs + uijs, (37)
where uijs ∼ N(0, σ2u).
Given that only positive export data are used in estimating (37), the consistent
estimation of (37) requires correction of the sample selection bias. In addition, the
variable ψijs is not directly observable. The rest of this subsection introduces a
two-step procedure to consistently estimate (37), following Helpman et al. (2008).
Step One: A Consistent Estimator of ψijs
Note that when a positive export volume from country i to j in sector s is observed,
it must be the case that the firm with the highest quality in the sector can make
a profit from exporting to country j. As a result, the operating profits of this firm













As in Helpman et al. (2008), I specify the fixed exporting cost (in logs) between
country i and j as a linear function of a set of exclusion variables, Fij, i.e., ln fij =
δ0 + δFij − υij. Taking the logarithm of both sides of (38) yields










ij − δFij + vijs, (39)
where zijs ≡ ln(Zijs), and vijs ≡ αsuijs + υij. In this specification, χ0 = − ln εs +
(εs−1) lnαs−δ0 is a constant term, χi = (εs−1)(1−a) lnλis−εs ln cis+(εs−1) lnAis
34
is a fixed effect for the exporting country, χj = (εs−1) lnPjs+lnEjs is a fixed effect
for the importing country, and vijs ∼ N(0, σ2v).
According to (38), when there is a positive recorded trade volume from country
i to j in sector s, Zijs > 1, implying that zijs ≡ ln(Zijs) > 0. Thus, based on the
participation in trade between country i and j in sector s, (39) can be estimated
using a Probit model that specifies the probability of country i exporting j as a
function of observable variables. After estimating this Probit model, let P̂ rijs be
the predicted probability of country i exporting to j in sector s, then the latent
variable zijs is predicted as ẑijs ≡ σvΦ−1(P̂ rijs), where Φ(·) is the c.d.f. of the
standard normal distribution. I can also calculate the expectation of white noise
uijs, conditional on country i exporting to j in the sector. Let Eijs denote a dummy
that equals one if country i exports to j in sector s, and zero otherwise. Normal
distributions of uijs and vijs imply that E[uijs|Eijs = 1] = ρσuu∗ijs, where ρ is the
correlation coefficient between uijs and vijs, u
∗
ijs ≡ φ(Φ−1(P̂ rijs))/P̂ rijs, and φ(.) is
the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution (see Appendix D for the proof).
Using the definition of cutoff quality ν∗ and equation (38) implies that Zijs =
(ν∗)(1−εs)(1−a).17 Then because zijs = ln Zijs and ψijs = ln[1 − (ν∗ijs)(1−a)(εs−1)+ks ],















((εs − 1)(1− a) + ks) zijs
]}
. (40)
Following Helpman et al. (2008), I approximate the RHS of (40) by a polynomial of









ijs, where fp and gq are coefficients.
18
17Recall that ν∗ is the cut-off quality such that πijs(ν∗) = 0, where πijs(.) is given by (31b). Using (38), the
zero-profit condition πijs(ν
∗) = 0 yields Zijs = (ν∗)(1−εs)(1−a).
18Helpman et al. (2008) use a polynomial of E[zijs|Eijs = 1] to approximate E[ψijs|Eijs = 1], which is the-
oretically inappropriate since the expectations operator cannot directly enter the power function due to Jensen’s
inequality. 35
Step Two: Estimating (37) using positive trade data
Employing these specifications, I can now consistently estimate (37) using only
positive trade data with the following specification:











+E [ψijs|Eijs = 1] + E [uijs|Eijs = 1] + eijs























ijs + eijs, (41)
where %0 = θ0 + f0, and eijs is the error term satisfying E [eijs|Eijs = 1] = 0.19
As indicated before, the advantage of this specification is that it simultaneously
accounts for selection biases in trade and firms’ heterogeneity.
3.3.2 Product Quality Evaluation
To improve the efficiency of estimation, I estimate (41) using FGLS method, taking
into account the heteroscedasticity of the error term. Using θi = (1 − εs)(ln cis −
lnAis) + (εs − 1)(1− a) lnλis + lnNis, after estimation, (41) can be written as
























≡ (εs − 1)(1− a) lnλis + (1− εs) ln(ĉis/Âis) + ln N̂is + ξ̂Ξ + êijs, (42)
where Ξ includes all other variables (excluding the dummy for the exporting coun-
try), and ξ̂ represents the vector of the corresponding estimated coefficients. The
variable ĉis is directly calculated using data on wages and interest rates, and Âis is
19V ar[eijs|Eijs = 1] need not be the same across countries, since trade volume data are quite heteroscedastic.
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approximated by the Solow residual. A comparison of the fixed effect of the export-
ing country in (36) with that in (39) implies that ln N̂is = θ̂i − χ̂i − ln ĉis. However,
εs cannot be estimated in this paper, so I use estimates from other studies.
From (42), lnλis can be expressed as follows:
lnλis =
1
(εs − 1)(1− a)
[
ln(EXijs)− (1− εs) ln(ĉis/Âis)− ln N̂is − ξ̂Ξ− êijs
]
.





ln(EXijs)− (1− εs) ln(ĉis/Âis)− ln N̂is − ξ̂Ξ
]
. (43)
Suppose that country i exports products in sector s to J countries, then I have J
estimates of ln λ̂ijs, j = 1, ..., J . Denote V̂ ar(eijs) the estimated variance of eijs, I
use a weighted average of ln λ̂ijs as the final estimate of lnλis, where the weight is
1/V̂ ar(eijs).
21 Specifically, I regress J estimates on a constant using weighted OLS
(with the weight equaling to 1/
√
V̂ ar(eijs)), then use the estimated constant as the
final estimate of sectoral product quality (in logs).
3.4 Data
This section provides an overview of the data employed in my analysis. Appendix
C provides details about data sources and the construction of variables. I use several
data sources to construct country– and industry–level data.
The data on value added, investment, labor, compensation of labor, price indexes,
and R&D come from the Structural Analysis (STAN) database, OECD (2008a).
20Since 1/(1 − a) is positive and constant across sectors, countries, and years, it has no role when comparing
product quality across countries or over time. Thus, I disregard this (unobserved) coefficient when estimating the
logarithm of sectoral quality.
21Asymptotically, ln N̂is and ξ̂ all go to the true value, thus the variance of ln λ̂ijs goes to [(1−αs)/αs]2V ar(eijs).
I thus give more weight to estimators which are more accurately estimated when using 1/V̂ ar(eijs) as the weight.
The logic is the same as that behind GLS estimation, and consequently the ultimate quality estimator is more
efficient.
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Following Unel (2008), I use worker-hours as labor input and the data on annual
working hours per worker are from the labor force statistics, OECD (2012). Upon
constructing labor, capital, and output data, I construct sectoral-level Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) using the standard TFP-level accounting approach. Data on
sectoral-level elasticity of substitution are from Imbs and Mejean (2009) (See Table
1).
Export data come from the UN Comtrade database via the World Integrated
Trade Solution (WITs), developed by the World Bank.22 Trade barrier variables are
drawn from various sources: bilateral tariff data are from the Trade Analysis and In-
formation System (TRAINS) database, whereas data on bilateral distance, common
border, common language, colonial relationship, common legal origin, common cur-
rency, and free trade agreements (FTAs) are all from the CEPII database. I combine
the data from Helpman et al. (2008) and World Bank to construct the landlocked
dummy. GDP and GDP per capita data are from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) database. The religion data come from Helpman et al. (2008); and data on
economic freedom are obtained from the Heritage Foundation.
Constrained by the availability of data, I construct a panel data set on twelve
manufacturing industries in twenty countries between 1995 and 2006. The countries
are Austria (AUT), Canada (CAN), the Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU),
Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), the United King-
dom (GBR), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Italy (ITA), the Netherlands (NLD),
22Comtrade declares that import data may be recorded with higher precision due to the tariff consideration.
However, not all countries in the world report their import data to the UN. In the early portion of 1995-2006, the
number of countries reporting import data is rather limited, suggesting that some countries in my analysis might
export to all other countries. In this case, neither the fixed effects of these countries nor their product quality can be
estimated in the extensive analysis. Consequently, I use export data instead of import data even though the latter
were recorded more precisely.
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TABLE 1: Sectoral Elasticity of Substitution







Non-metallic Mineral (26) 5.87
Basic Metals (27) 5.7
Fabricated Metal (28) 3.81
Machinery (29) 5.11
Electrical (30T33) 6.63
Transport Equipment (34T35) 4.8
Note: The table is calculated from the estimates of Imbs and Mejean
(2009). The elasticities of substitution for 3-digit ISIC Rev.3 industries
are averaged to the 2-digit level, which are then averaged to the sectoral
level if the sector consists of two or more 2-digit industries.
Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia
(SVN), Sweden (SWE), and the United States (USA). The twelve manufacturing
sectors are at the two-digit ISIC level: food products and beverage (ISIC 15); textile
products, leather and footwear (ISIC 17T19); wood and products of wood and cork
(ISIC 20); pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (ISIC 21T22); chem-
icals and chemical products (ISIC 24); rubber and plastics products (ISIC 25); other
non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 26); basic metals (ISIC 27); fabricated metal
products, except machinery and equipment (ISIC 28); machinery and equipment




To consistently estimate the gravity model requires exclusion variables which affect
selection into trade while having no impact on the intensive margin. Helpman et al.
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(2008) construct an exclusion variable based on the cost as well as the amount of time
and procedures to set up a business in both countries. However, the data is only for
1986 and not suitable for this study covering many years. There is another variable,
Religion in their paper, reflecting the extent of similarity between religions of both
countries. It works well as an exclusion variable in their country-level study, but
is not as effective in this sector-level research. As a preliminary check, I estimate
(39) and (41) including Religion as a regressor, but not correcting for biases of
sample selection and firms’ heterogeneity when regressing (41).23 As shown in Table
2, Religion is not a good exclusion variable for six sectors: Paper, Chemical, Rubber,
Fabricated metal, Machinery, and Transport equipment.
I then construct a new exclusion variable, Economic Freedom, from the Index
of Economic Freedom created by the Heritage Foundation. The Index of Economic
Freedom is comprehensive in that it covers government regulation, availability of
finance, labor cost, etc., which are supposed to directly relate to the fixed costs of
maintaining a trade relationship in a foreign country, instead of variable trade costs.
Table 3 shows that Economic Freedom outperforms the Religion of Helpman et al.
(2008), and only in two sectors (Textile and Transport equipment) does it fail as
an exclusion variable. In addition, I find that Colonial Relationship Post 1945 is an
eligible exclusion variable for several sectors, as shown in Table 4. Consequently, each
sector in this study has at least one exclusion variable in the extensive analysis.24
23FGLS method is used when regressing (41), and the logarithm of standard error of the error term is assumed
to be a linear function of GDP and GDP per capita of both countries as well as the distance between them (all in
logs).
24Helpman et al. (2008) also find that Common Language is another valid exclusion variable in their country-level
study. Additionally, they find the coefficient of Common Border has opposite signs in the extensive and intensive
analyses, which provides an extra source of identification. Those results, however, are not found in this sector-level
study.
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Finally, I use Religion and Economic Freedom as exclusion variables for the fol-
lowing sectors: Food, Wood, Non-metallic mineral, Basic metals, and Electrical. I
choose Economic Freedom and Colonial Relationship Post 1945 for sectors of Paper,
Fabricated metal and Machinery. The remaining sectors having only one exclusion
variable are as follows: Religion for Textile; Economic Freedom for the sectors of
Rubber and Chemicals; and Colonial Relationship Post 1945 for Transport equip-
ment.
Table 5 shows the main results when regressing (39). Some gravity variables have
the expected impact on selection into trade across all sectors, such as common
language, distance between countries, and the dummy indicating if they belong to
the same regional trade agreement (RTA); whereas other variables affect different
sectors differently. For instance, sharing a common border is found to only facilitate
trade in the sectors of Textile, Wood, and Non-metallic mineral. In a country-level
study, Helpman et al. (2008) report negative effects of being an island or landlocked
on the incidence of trade. In this paper, however, being an island is found to be
beneficial for trade in the sector of Wood, which makes sense since transportation
costs can be greatly reduced. Besides, international trade in sectors of Textile and
Machinery is more likely to occur between landlocked countries.
I estimate (41) using the FGLS method, explicitly taking into account the het-
eroscedasticity in trade volume.25 Although there is no theory explaining heteroscedas-
ticity in trade volume, I assume that the variance of export value is a function
25Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2009) claim that the model of Helpman et al. (2008) is too restrictive in that it
does not allow for the heteroscedasticity of trade data. They then suggest a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
method which accommodates heteroscedasticity in both the likelihood of trade and trade volume. In this paper, I
adapt the model of Helpman et al. (2008) to accommodate heteroscedasticity in trade volume by assuming that
V ar[eijs|Eijs = 1] varies across countries.
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TABLE 2: Exclusion Restriction Test for Variable, Religion
Extensive Analysis Intensive Analysis
Sector 1995 2000 2006 1995 2000 2006
Food 0.566 0.691 0.665 -0.211 0.174 0.152
(0.134)*** (0.125)*** (0.121)*** (0.153) (0.153) (0.143)
Textiles 0.441 0.317 0.448 -0.18 0.147 -0.0917
(0.131)*** (0.13)** (0.13)*** (0.175) (0.168) (0.156)
Wood 0.395 0.58 0.33 -0.167 0.0397 -0.0343
(0.151)*** (0.148)*** (0.131)** (0.238) (0.218) (0.196)
Paper 0.561 0.436 0.701 0.516 0.393 0.343
(0.164)*** (0.159)*** (0.15)*** (0.171)*** (0.176)** (0.163)**
Chemicals 0.846 0.714 0.683 0.487 0.454 0.197
(0.145)*** (0.139)*** (0.13)*** (0.144)*** (0.151)*** (0.148)
Rubber 0.561 0.595 0.613 0.435 0.491 0.204
(0.145)*** (0.134)*** (0.134)*** (0.149)*** (0.153)*** (0.142)
Non-metallic 0.701 0.895 0.704 0.0816 0.268 0.2
Minerals (0.137)*** (0.134)*** (0.131)*** (0.175) (0.174) (0.166)
Basic metals 0.729 0.214 0.475 0.0768 0.164 0.483
(0.136)*** (0.129)* (0.123)*** (0.203) (0.219) (0.284)*
Fabricated 0.79 0.557 0.472 0.071 0.404 0.227
Metal (0.162)*** (0.159)*** (0.138)*** (0.155) (0.138)*** (0.135)*
Machinery 0.431 0.69 0.519 0.337 0.5 0.302
(0.187)** (0.167)*** (0.16)*** (0.118)*** (0.133)*** (0.125)**
Electrical 0.467 0.936 0.894 0.0385 0.0679 0.091
(0.172)*** (0.172)*** (0.151)*** (0.155) (0.161) (0.153)
Transport 0.279 0.474 0.209 0.256 0.472 0.176
Equipment (0.164)* (0.16)*** (0.145) (0.223) (0.214)** (0.197)
Note: This table reports the coefficient of Religion when regressing equation (39) and (41) for
1995, 2000 and 2006. Equation (39) uses the Probit model whereas (41) uses the FGLS method.
Robust standard errors are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10%
significant level, respectively.
42
TABLE 3: Exclusion Restriction Test for Variable, Economic Freedom
Extensive Analysis Intensive Analysis
Sector 1995 2000 2006 1995 2000 2006
Food 0.267 0.183 0.303 -0.029 -0.243 -0.201
(0.114)** (0.1)* (0.099)*** (0.235) (0.18) (0.166)
Textiles 0.058 0.352 0.12 -0.62 -0.409 -0.213
(0.125) (0.11)*** (0.116) (0.204)*** (0.207)** (0.171)
Wood 0.445 0.291 0.125 0.0078 -0.117 0.0713
(0.129)*** (0.115)** (0.104) (0.351) (0.278) (0.25)
Paper 0.764 0.624 0.541 0.454 -0.202 0.163
(0.139)*** (0.117)*** (0.111)*** (0.242)* (0.238) (0.194)
Chemicals 0.547 0.806 0.649 0.295 0.092 0.273
(0.123)*** (0.113)*** (0.112)*** (0.166)* (0.153) (0.151)*
Rubber 0.528 0.321 0.213 0.165 -0.065 0.03
(0.125)*** (0.112)*** (0.113)* (0.17) (0.175) (0.146)
Non-metallic 0.493 0.368 0.454 0.073 0.265 0.276
Minerals (0.121)*** (0.111)*** (0.109)*** (0.221) (0.211) (0.17)
Basic metals 0.249 0.411 0.393 -0.459 -0.33 0.21
(0.114)** (0.1)*** (0.099)*** (0.25)* (0.224) (0.184)
Fabricated 0.317 0.514 0.733 0.211 -0.252 0.064
Metal (0.136)** (0.125)*** (0.115)*** (0.212) (0.214) (0.164)
Machinery 0.617 0.733 0.435 -0.079 -0.181 0.097
(0.152)*** (0.136)*** (0.128)*** (0.186) (0.178) (0.135)
Electrical 0.382 0.38 0.39 0.341 0.023 0.059
(0.155)** (0.138)*** (0.13)*** (0.189)* (0.184) (0.166)
Transport 0.33 0.467 0.472 0.737 0.131 -0.018
Equipment (0.135)** (0.127)*** (0.123)*** (0.268)*** (0.228) (0.238)
Note: This table reports the coefficient of Economic Freedom when regressing equation (39) and
(41) for 1995, 2000 and 2006. Equation (39) uses the Probit model whereas (41) uses the FGLS
method. Robust standard errors are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%,
and 10% significant level, respectively.
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TABLE 4: Exclusion Restriction Test for Variable,Colonial Relationship Post 1945
Extensive Analysis Intensive Analysis
Sector 1995 2000 2006 1995 2000 2006
Paper 1.289 1.698 1.467 -0.074 0.178 0.247
(0.44)*** (0.507)*** (0.444)*** (0.349) (0.309) (0.25)
Fabricated 1.038 1.331 0.906 0.259 -0.021 0.1
Metal (0.403)*** (0.388)*** (0.373)** (0.303) (0.24) (0.295)
Machinery 1.407 0.845 0.576 -0.036 -0.096 0.386
(0.478)*** (0.448)** (0.432) (0.281) (0.229) (0.262)
Transport 1.319 1.502 1.338 0.026 -0.31 0.0297
Equipment (0.386)*** (0.35)*** (0.363)*** (0.409) (0.32) (0.405)
Note: This table reports the coefficient of Colonial Relationship Post 1945 when
regressing equation (39) and (41) for 1995, 2000 and 2006. Equation (39) uses the
Probit model whereas (41) uses the FGLS method. Robust standard errors are in-
cluded in the parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level,
respectively.
of GDP of exporting and importing countries (in logs), based on the evidence pro-
vided by Flam and Nordstrom (2011). In addition, I assume that the variance de-
pends on the GDP per capita of both countries and the distance between them (all
in logs). Table 6 shows that the variance of export value negatively relates to GDP
and GDP per capita of both countries in most cases, consistent with the finding of
Flam and Nordstrom (2011). Besides, it also positively correlates with the distance
between them. Those variables explain a significant portion of the variance with
R-square over 0.27 in most sectors.
Table 7 reports the results when estimating (41). Since generated regressors are
used in (41), I repeatedly re-sample countries with replacement and report boot-
strapped standard errors. As expected, sharing a common border and legal origin
both have positive effects on trade volume in all sectors, whereas distance adversely
affects the trade between countries. However, the negative impact of tariffs is only
found in the sectors of Wood, Rubber, Fabricated metal, Machinery and Electrical.
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Different from the findings of Helpman et al. (2008), being an island is found to
be beneficial to trade in some sectors, while sharing a common currency negatively
correlates with trade volume in nearly half of the sectors.26 Note that the coefficient
of u∗ijs is precisely estimated in most cases. When the coefficient is not significant, as
for the Paper sector, the coefficient of ẑ2ijs is accurately estimated.
27 Consequently, in
this sector-level study, the biases caused by selection into trade and (or) firms’ het-
erogeneity are important in all cases, which is compatible with other country-level
research (e.g., Helpman et al. (2008) and Flam and Nordstrom (2011)).28
3.5.2 Product Quality
Having estimated parameters, I use the approach described in Section 3.3.2 to
evaluate countries’ product quality sector by sector and year by year. To facilitate
comparison across countries, I first calculate the overall quality index by averaging
sectors’ product quality for each country, weighted by the share of each sector in
value added of total manufacturing.29 Following Hallak and Schott (2011), I subtract
the calculated overall quality by the annual mean of all countries. Table 8 lists the
demeaned quality of 19 OECD countries (excluding New Zealand) and their rankings
for selected years. The last column also lists the change of demeaned overall quality
and its rank between 1995 and 2006.
26Flam and Nordstrom (2011) also find a negative effect of currency union on the intensive margin of trade. They







ijs are dropped from the specification because they are highly correlated with either
ẑ2ijs or u
∗
ijs (with correlation coefficient greater than 0.9). In cases where ẑ
3






28However, when the coefficient of u∗ijs is significant, I cannot tell if it is because of selection into trade or firms’
heterogeneity. This is because E[ψijs|Eijs = 1] and E[uijs|Eijs = 1] in (41) all have u∗ijs included.
29Constrained by data availability for some countries, the product quality of several sectors cannot be estimated,
which limits the comparability of calculated overall quality across countries. The situation is especially serious for
New Zealand, who has complete data for only 3 sectors (Food, Textile, and Non-metallic mineral). Therefore, I
drop New Zealand and calculate the overall quality index for the other 19 countries. As a robustness check, I also
construct the overall quality index using only sectoral quality estimates available to all the 19 countries. However,
the ranking of the countries’ overall quality is quite similar to that in Table 8.
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TABLE 5: The Results of Analyzing the Extensive Margin
Food Textile Wood Paper Chemicals Rubber
Contiguity 0.458 1.888 0.936 0.00083 0.259 0.548
(0.3) (0.38)*** (0.307)*** (0.26) (0.39) (0.355)
Common Language 0.474 0.433 0.513 0.75 0.525 0.571
(0.096)*** (0.101)*** (0.099)*** (0.106)*** (0.108)*** (0.105)***
Common Colonizer 0.418 0.239 0.366 0.631 0.178 1.046
Post 1945 (0.137)*** (0.163) (0.161)** (0.185)*** (0.171) (0.181)***
Colonial Relationship 0.932 1.329 0.496 1.589 0.698 0.321
Post 1945 (0.7) (0.508)*** (0.342) (0.486)*** (0.661) (0.47)
Colonial Relationship 0.317 0.46 0.436 0.456 1.456 0.49
Ever (0.59) (0.38) (0.276) (0.274)* (0.554)*** (0.37)
Common Legal 0.19 0.327 0.118 0.206 0.124 0.175
Origin (0.067)*** (0.072)*** (0.069)* (0.075)*** (0.077) (0.078)**
Distance (in logs) -1.168 -1.196 -1.104 -1.444 -1.292 -1.212
(0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.065)*** (0.079)*** (0.083)*** (0.078)***
Island -0.07 -0.14 0.569 -0.614 0.139 0.183
(0.24) (0.25) (0.213)*** (0.286)** (0.27) (0.233)
Landlocked 0.226 0.491 0.112 -0.107 0.246 0.25
(0.229) (0.231)** (0.274) (0.286) (0.221) (0.23)
Common Currency 1.142 2.45 0.206 0.934 0.941 0.689
(0.284)*** (0.392)*** (0.325) (0.423)** (0.452)** (0.407)*
Regional Trade 0.483 0.613 0.319 0.233 0.432 0.566
Agreement (0.109)*** (0.114)*** (0.105)*** (0.112)** (0.118)*** (0.144)***
Religion 0.651 0.448 0.315
(0.128)*** (0.13)*** (0.135)**
Economic Freedom 0.303 0.125 0.57 0.637 0.291
(0.099)*** (0.104) (0.108)*** (0.106)*** (0.109)***






mineral metals metal equipment
Contiguity 1.277 0.46 0.072 0.502 0.219 0.433
(0.486)*** (0.28) (0.29) (0.311) (0.381) (0.253)*
Common Language 0.659 0.566 0.601 0.774 0.765 0.488
(0.108)*** (0.106)*** (0.112)*** (0.122)*** (0.126)*** (0.108)***
Common Colonizer 0.694 0.606 0.44 -0.138 0.102 0.413
Post 1945 (0.17)*** (0.156)*** (0.184)** (0.212) (0.238) (0.189)**
Colonial Rela. 0.789 0.3 1.042 0.88 1.851 1.338
Post 1945 (0.485) (0.48) (0.407)*** (0.462)* (0.534)*** (0.363)***
Colonial Rela. 0.0059 0.621 0.19 0.638 -0.025 0.25
Ever (0.364) (0.381) (0.29) (0.323)** (0.26) (0.23)
Common Legal 0.098 0.203 0.238 0.073 0.082 0.257
Origin (0.073) (0.071)*** (0.081)*** (0.093) (0.088) (0.073)***
Distance (in logs) -1.082 -1.041 -1.382 -1.388 -1.225 -1.106
(0.073)*** (0.072)*** (0.08)*** (0.088)*** (0.093)*** (0.071)***
Island 0.265 0.077 -0.061 -0.028 -0.067 0.101
(0.27) (0.28) (0.26) (0.31) (0.309) (0.301)
Landlocked 0.339 0.18 -0.12 0.575 -0.069 0.211
(0.226) (0.21) (0.26) (0.239)** (0.25) (0.275)
Common Currency 1.193 0.769 0.761 -0.33 0.835 0.422
(0.409)*** (0.279)*** (0.34)** (0.42) (0.69) (0.303)
Regional Trade 0.488 0.665 0.31 0.564 0.213 0.302
Agreement (0.114)*** (0.107)*** (0.11)*** (0.132)*** (0.126)* (0.11)***
Religion 0.703 0.448 0.893
(0.137)*** (0.13)*** (0.157)***
Economic Freedom 0.454 0.393 0.749 0.437 0.39
(0.109)*** (0.099)*** (0.111)*** (0.127)*** (0.13)***
Observations 6857 7385 7090 7200 7069 7541
Note: This table reports the results when regressing equation (39). The Probit model is used, and the data are for 2006. Robust
standard errors are included in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level, respectively.
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TABLE 6: The Determination of Heteroscedasticity of Exports
GDP GDP Per Capita GDP GDP Per Capita
Distance R2
(Importer) (Importer) (Exporter) (Exporter)
Food -0.0001 -0.123 -0.154 -0.025 0.0975 0.31
(0.033) (0.038)*** (0.028)*** (0.034) (0.0484)**
Textile 0.0923 -0.163 -0.167 0.011 0.076 0.28
(0.042)** (0.043)*** (0.03)*** (0.032) (0.048)
Wood 0.097 -0.186 -0.12 0.052 0.245 0.3
(0.036)*** (0.051)*** (0.033)*** (0.042) (0.053)***
Paper 0.09 -0.156 -0.04 -0.136 0.201 0.27
(0.053)* (0.072)** (0.045) (0.059)** (0.071)***
Chemicals -0.068 -0.0013 -0.158 -0.016 0.077 0.29
(0.032)** (0.043) (0.028)*** (0.037) (0.045)*
Rubber -0.062 0.086 -0.118 -0.07 0.151 0.29
(0.036)* (0.05)* (0.034)*** (0.038)* (0.047)***
Non-metallic -0.069 -0.054 -0.145 0.044 0.177 0.26
Mineral (0.041)* (0.048) (0.033)*** (0.04) (0.043)***
Basic Metals -0.072 0.159 -0.205 -0.065 0.205 0.32
(0.034)** (0.049)*** (0.053)*** (0.035)* (0.052)***
Fabricated 0.0093 -0.213 -0.08 -0.018 0.154 0.28
Metal (0.047) (0.054)*** (0.042)** (0.054) (0.057)***
Machinery -0.118 -0.005 -0.14 -0.068 0.137 0.23
(0.054)** (0.055) (0.044)*** (0.052) (0.056)**
Electrical -0.122 -0.008 -0.114 -0.07 0.159 0.27
(0.042)*** (0.056) (0.033)*** (0.043) (0.054)***
Transport 0.001 -0.142 -0.018 -0.149 0.045 0.29
Equipment (0.047) (0.051)*** (0.038) (0.043)*** (0.052)
Note: Equation (41) is first regressed. Then the logarithm of the square of estimated error term is regressed on a
constant, the GDP and GDP per capita of both countries as well as the distance between them (all in logs). The data
are for 2006. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level,
respectively.
48
TABLE 7: The Results of Analyzing the Intensive Margin
Food Textile Wood Paper Chemicals Rubber
Tariff 1.31e-05 0.00017 -0.0714 -0.0088 -0.01 -0.031
(0.00014) (0.0057) (0.019)*** (0.014) (0.012) (0.011)***
Contiguity 0.749 0.407 0.596 0.451 0.337 0.54
(0.114)*** (0.122)** (0.132)*** (0.11)*** (0.107)*** (0.106)***
Common Language 0.23 0.189 0.119 0.151 0.273 0.121
(0.097)** (0.097)** (0.123) (0.113) (0.098)*** (0.094)
Common Colonizer 0.0033 -2.1 0.377 0.097 0.163 -0.117
Post 1945 (0.728) (0.659)*** (0.733) (0.976) (0.618) (0.65)
Colonial Relationship 0.426 0.553 0.041 -0.23 0.387
Post 1945 (0.27) (0.283)* (0.3) (0.228) (0.264)
Colonial Relationship 0.306 0.112 0.477 0.369 0.097 0.018
Ever (0.127)** (0.122) (0.16)*** (0.113)*** (0.118) (0.107)
Common Legal 0.25 0.219 0.259 0.411 0.311 0.356
Origin (0.065)*** (0.066)*** (0.093)*** (0.075)*** (0.066)*** (0.059)***
Distance (in logs) -0.929 -1.14 -1.198 -0.995 -0.964 -1.1
(0.056)*** (0.064)*** (0.084)*** (0.065)*** (0.055)*** (0.057)***
Island 0.287 0.039 0.508 1.066 0.415 0.21
(0.215) (0.26) (0.388) (0.242)*** (0.226)* (0.17)
Landlocked 0.532 0.172 0.246 -0.246 0.203 0.02
(0.221)** (0.169) (0.23) (0.198) (0.18) (0.18)
Common Currency 0.204 -0.099 -0.301 -0.081 0.03 -0.226
(0.104)* (0.109) (0.135) (0.108) (0.105) (0.096)**
Regional Trade 0.31 0.095 -0.383 0.596 0.398 0.365
Agreement (0.098)*** (0.131) (0.157)** (0.12)*** (0.106)*** (0.11)***
ẑ2ijs 0.102 0.131 0.139 0.082 0.148 0.28
(0.039)*** (0.013)*** (0.018)*** (0.014)*** (0.039)*** (0.061)***
ẑ3ijs -0.004 -0.008 -0.048
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017)**
u∗ijs 0.427 0.705 0.618 0.205 0.681 0.576
(0.091)*** (0.128)*** (0.127)*** (0.125) (0.122)*** (0.157)***






mineral metals metal equipment
Tariff -0.007 -0.0087 -0.024 -0.029 -0.036 -0.0055
(0.014) (0.02) (0.013)* (0.014)** (0.011)*** (0.007)
Contiguity 0.577 0.513 0.533 0.39 0.208 0.478
(0.109)*** (0.126)*** (0.103)*** (0.1)*** (0.121)* (0.144)***
Common Language 0.197 -0.128 0.068 0.285 0.264 0.131
(0.104)* (0.131) (0.087) (0.09)*** (0.108)** (0.131)
Common Colonizer -0.617 0.674 -0.47 0.528 -0.64 1.43
Post 1945 (0.629) (0.564) (0.66) (0.446) (0.65) (0.353)***
Colonial Relationship 0.126 -0.018 0.438
Post 1945 (0.297) (0.341) (0.334)
Colonial Relationship 0.129 0.358 0.164 0.137 -0.072 -0.069
Ever (0.114) (0.167)** (0.095)* (0.097) (0.11) (0.159)
Common Legal 0.273 0.229 0.328 0.197 0.249 0.252
Origin (0.065)*** (0.093)** (0.059)*** (0.054)*** (0.067)** (0.084)***
Distance (in logs) -1.14 -1.03 -1.03 -0.839 -0.964 -0.781
(0.062)*** (0.071)*** (0.053)*** (0.051)*** (0.06)*** (0.092)***
Island 0.73 0.867 0.512 0.544 0.166 0.426
(0.37)** (0.277) (0.257)** (0.173)*** (0.241) (0.234)
Landlocked -0.021 0.057 0.077 -0.059 -0.392 -0.149
(0.167) (0.227) (0.147) (0.13) (0.155)** (0.191)
Common Currency -0.135 0.0007 -0.253 -0.208 -0.279 -0.298
(0.107) (0.14) (0.088)*** (0.081)** (0.1)*** (0.124)**
Regional Trade 0.075 0.47 0.099 0.264 0.197 0.573
Agreement (0.131) (0.136)*** (0.113) (0.095)** (0.115)* (0.145)***
ẑ2ijs 0.092 0.354 0.178 0.098 0.119 0.117
(0.056)* (0.092)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.013)*** (0.016)***
ẑ3ijs 0.01 -0.051 -0.02
(0.016) (0.026)** (0.009)**
u∗ijs 0.519 0.257 0.452 0.717 0.797 0.753
(0.151)*** (0.226) (0.107)*** (0.128)*** (0.127)*** (0.141)***
Observations 1538 1550 1348 1379 1445 1275






ijs are dropped since
they are highly correlated with ẑ2ijs or u
∗
ijs (with correlation coefficient greater than 0.9). When ẑ
3
ijs is highly correlated with ẑ
2
ijs
or u∗ijs, it is also dropped from the specification. The data are for 2006. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **,
and * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% significant level, respectively.
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It is interesting to find that the estimated quality levels vary substantially across
countries and over time. In 2006 for instance, Italy, France, and Spain took the first
three places in the rank of overall product quality, whereas Slovenia, Finland, and
the Slovak Republic were the countries with the lowest overall product quality. As to
the change of quality, the Czech Republic and Greece underwent the greatest rise in
their overall product quality, from 17th and 18th in 1995, respectively, to 11th and
12th in 2006. On the other hand, the biggest fall in overall product quality ranking
happened in Austria, with its 1995 rank of 7th plummeting to 15th in 2006.
Note that even within a country, product quality for different sectors differs a lot,
and undergoes different changes. Take the U.S. as an example: as shown in Table 9,
its quality rank in Textile decreased from 4th to 7th during 1995-2006, whereas its
rank in Transport Equipment climbed 3 places during the period.30
The change in demeaned quality in Table 8 indicates product quality convergence
over time, first reported by Hallak and Schott (2011). The average demeaned quality
of countries with overall quality greater than the annual mean decreased from 0.378
to 0.298 during 1995-2006, whereas the average for other countries with below-mean
overall quality increases from -0.378 to -0.364 during the period. I also divide the
19 OECD countries into two equal-size groups (high-income/low-income) according
to their GDP per capita in 1995 (the median country is dropped). Figure 3 depicts
the evolution of the average of demeaned overall quality within each group. It is
clear that there is a convergence in overall quality between the high and low income
groups.
30Surprisingly, the U.S.’s product quality in Electrical ranks only 16th in 2006. However, this may be due to the
problem in the U.S.’s value added deflator in that sector. The deflator decreases from 2.817 in 1995 to only 0.508 in
2006, suggesting that it has been “quality-adjusted” (Unel, 2008). Consequently, the real value added and sectoral
TFP will be over-estimated, whereas the product quality in the sector will be under-estimated since TFP acts as a
subtracter when estimating product quality. Sweden also confronts the same problem – its value added deflator in
Electrical decreases from 2.625 to 0.428 during 1995-2006. As a result, its product quality in that sector ranks only
18th in 2006.
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TABLE 8: The Product Quality and its Rank of 19 OECD Countries
Demeaned Quality
Country 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006 Change
Germany 0.983 0.639 0.676 0.695 0.608 0.415 0.278 -0.705
France 0.697 0.513 0.495 0.463 0.460 0.448 0.458 -0.239
Netherlands 0.475 0.367 0.386 0.350 0.395 0.253 0.244 -0.232
Spain 0.367 0.369 0.396 0.337 0.363 0.411 0.390 0.023
Italy 0.364 0.559 0.643 0.569 0.647 0.782 0.774 0.410
United States 0.346 0.327 0.419 0.853 0.478 0.258 0.125 -0.221
Austria 0.317 0.026 -0.023 -0.133 -0.227 -0.312 -0.411 -0.728
Denmark 0.158 0.054 0.108 0.072 0.140 0.172 0.161 0.003
United Kingdom 0.062 0.077 0.271 0.399 0.280 0.311 0.239 0.177
Sweden -0.145 0.054 -0.054 0.053 -0.077 -0.191 -0.354 -0.209
Norway -0.147 0.037 0.055 -0.057 -0.074 -0.037 0.068 0.214
Canada -0.171 -0.136 -0.205 -0.066 -0.133 0.000 0.054 0.225
Finland -0.186 -0.237 -0.369 -0.338 -0.470 -0.420 -0.604 -0.417
Slovenia -0.296 -0.624 -0.528 -0.526 -0.705 -0.460 -0.501 -0.204
Portugal -0.425 -0.474 -0.366 -0.290 -0.275 -0.250 -0.167 0.258
Hungary -0.440 -0.590 -0.580 -0.437 -0.440 -0.299 -0.429 0.011
Czech Republic -0.460 -0.488 -0.353 -0.216 -0.092 -0.012 -0.092 0.368
Greece -0.550 -0.295 -0.332 -0.656 -0.343 -0.319 -0.109 0.441
Slovak Republic -0.962 -0.481 -0.749 -0.618 -0.492 -0.658 -0.615 0.347
Rank
Country 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006 Change
Germany 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 -3
France 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 0
Netherlands 3 5 6 6 5 7 5 -2
Spain 4 4 5 7 6 4 3 1
Italy 5 2 2 3 1 1 1 4
United States 6 6 4 1 3 6 8 -2
Austria 7 11 10 12 13 15 15 -8
Denmark 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 1
United Kingdom 9 7 7 5 7 5 6 3
Sweden 10 9 11 9 10 12 14 -4
Norway 11 10 9 10 9 11 9 2
Canada 12 12 12 11 12 9 10 2
Finland 13 13 16 15 17 17 18 -5
Slovenia 14 19 17 17 19 18 17 -3
Portugal 15 15 15 14 14 13 13 2
Hungary 16 18 18 16 16 14 16 0
Czech Republic 17 17 14 13 11 10 11 6
Greece 18 14 13 19 15 16 12 6
Slovak Republic 19 16 19 18 18 19 19 0
Note: Sectoral product quality (in logs) is first averaged for each country, weighted by the share of each sector
in the value added of total manufacturing; then subtracted by the annual mean of all countries’ overall product
quality. The countries are listed according to their ranks of overall quality in 1995. The last column is the change
of demeaned quality and its rank during 1995-2006.
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TABLE 9: The Ranking of Sectoral Quality
A. Textile
Country 1995 2000 2006 Change
Austria 1 5 11 -10
Canada 15 17 5 10
Czech Rep. 10 12 14 -4
Germany 2 2 12 -10
Denmark 14 19 13 1
Spain 6 9 4 2
Finland 18 15 19 -1
France 7 8 9 -2
United Kindom 13 6 8 5
Greece 5 4 2 3
Hungary 19 14 10 9
Italy 9 7 1 8
Netherlands 8 11 15 -7
Norway 17 13 20 -3
New Zealand 11 10 6 5
Portugal 3 3 3 0
Slovakia 20 20 16 4
Slovenia 12 16 18 -6
Sweden 16 18 17 -1
USA 4 1 7 -3
B. Chemicals
Country 1995 2000 2006 Change
Austria 3 13 17 -14
Canada 9 7 2 7
Czech Rep. 15 15 12 3
Germany 1 4 11 -10
Denmark 4 12 9 -5
Spain 7 6 3 4
Finland 11 9 13 -2
United Kindom 6 2 4 2
Greece 14 14 5 9
Hungary 13 8 10 3
Italy 5 3 1 4
Netherlands 2 5 7 -5
Portugal 16 11 8 8
Slovakia 17 17 14 3
Slovenia 10 16 16 -6
Sweden 12 10 15 -3
USA 8 1 6 2
C. Machinery
Country 1995 2000 2006 Change
Austria 4 13 17 -13
Canada 19 16 8 11
Czech Rep. 17 15 11 6
Germany 1 2 2 -1
Denmark 10 7 6 4
Spain 6 11 7 -1
Finland 13 12 14 -1
France 2 5 5 -3
United Kindom 9 3 4 5
Greece 18 14 19 -1
Hungary 16 19 18 -2
Italy 3 4 1 2
Netherlands 7 10 10 -3
Norway 15 8 13 2
Portugal 12 17 9 3
Slovakia 8 6 16 -8
Slovenia 11 18 15 -4
Sweden 14 9 12 2
USA 5 1 3 2
D. Transport Equipment
Country 1995 2000 2006 Change
Austria 7 10 16 -9
Canada 15 12 10 5
Czech Rep. 12 15 13 -1
Germany 2 1 3 -1
Denmark 13 11 9 4
Spain 6 6 4 2
Finland 9 8 6 3
France 1 3 2 -1
United Kindom 11 5 8 3
Greece 18 19 19 -1
Hungary 17 18 17 0
Italy 4 4 1 3
Netherlands 5 7 7 -2
Norway 16 13 12 4
Portugal 3 14 15 -12
Slovakia 19 16 11 8
Slovenia 14 17 18 -4
Sweden 10 9 14 -4
USA 8 2 5 3
Note: This table lists countries’ ranking of four sectors’ product quality for three years. The last column is the alteration of
the ranking from 1995 to 2006.
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Figure 4 graphs the change of average demeaned quality in each group for 4 sectors.
The convergence of quality in the sector of Chemicals and Transport Equipment is
clear-cut. Product quality of Textile in the low-income group even surpassed the
high-income group in the second half of the period. To formally investigate the
quality convergence intra-sector, I regress the standard deviation of sectoral product
quality (in logs) at each year on a constant and time trend. As Table 10 shows, more
than half the sectors display the convergence in product quality.
Hallak and Schott (2011) also find that convergence in overall product quality
is at a higher rate than convergence in GDP per capita. To see if that happens
in this study, I calculate that the difference in the average of per-capita GDP (in
logs) between the two groups narrowed from 1.034 to 0.756 during 1995-2006, while
the gap in average overall quality almost vanished during the period (from 0.465 to
0.0035 during 1995-2006), confirming the finding of Hallak and Schott (2011).
Another finding of Hallak and Schott (2011) is that countries’ overall product
quality positively correlates with their per-capita income. However, the correlation
is weakening over time due to the different rates of convergence in overall quality and
per-capita GDP. I also check the relevance of this result to my study, and calculate
the coefficient of correlation between countries’ overall product quality and their
GDP per capita. The results confirm that the positive correlation is declining over
time.31
To examine if the correlation between product quality and per-capita GDP differs
across sectors, I redo the analysis above using sectoral quality estimates. The results
in Table 11 demonstrate the positive correlation in most cases. However, the extent of
31For example, the correlation coefficient between countries’ overall product quality and their GDP per capita is
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Note: 19 OECD countries are divided into two groups (high/low income) according to their GDP
per capita in 1995. Then the evolution of average demeaned overall quality within each group
is depicted.
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Note: 19 OECD countries are divided into two groups (high/low income) according to their GDP
per capita in 1995. Then the evolution of average demeaned sectoral quality within each group
is depicted.
Convergence of Sectoral Product Quality
FIGURE 4: The Change of Average Demeaned Sectoral Quality in 1995
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TABLE 10: Convergence of Sectoral Product Quality Over Years







Non-metallic mineral -0.0063 0.0019***
Basic metal 0.014 0.0069*
Fabricated metal 0.0059 0.0042
Machinery 0.0057 0.0031*
Electrical -0.013 0.0034***
Transport equipment -0.015 0.0018***
Note: This table regresses the standard deviation of sec-
toral product quality (in logs) at each year on a constant
and time trend. The coefficient of the time trend is re-
ported. *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% signifi-
cant level, respectively.
correlation differs enormously across sectors. For instance, in 2000 the strongest
correlation occurs in Transport equipment, whereas the weakest occurs in Non-
metallic mineral.32
Last but not least, although rich countries tend to have higher product quality
than poor countries, the quality gap between them is more pronounced in capital-
and skill-intensive sectors. To formally investigate how sectoral product quality re-
lates to sectors’ characteristics, I regress sectoral quality estimates (in logs) on mea-
surements of investment-, skill-, and R&D-intensity of the sector, and their interac-
tions with countries’ GDP per capita (in logs). Investment- and R&D-intensity are
defined as total fixed capital formation and R&D expenditure as a fraction of sec-
32Fadinger and Fleiss (2011) find that sectoral productivity also positively correlates with countries’ income per
capita, and in the mid nineties, the strongest correlation was in Metal products and the weakest in the sector of
Food.
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TABLE 11: Correlation Between Sectoral Product Quality and Per-capita GDP
Sector 1995 2000 2006 Average
Food 0.688 0.581 0.347 0.506
Textile 0.398 0.302 -0.225 0.145
Wood 0.525 0.502 0.231 0.432
Paper 0.482 0.561 0.362 0.501
Chemical 0.778 0.558 0.142 0.516
Rubber 0.504 0.598 0.292 0.512
Non-metallic mineral -0.065 0.139 0.026 0.105
Basic metal 0.56 0.52 0.377 0.48
Fabricated metal 0.498 0.534 0.383 0.515
Machinery 0.38 0.509 0.442 0.466
Electrical 0.403 0.527 0.076 0.382
Transport equipment 0.637 0.643 0.385 0.547
Note: This table shows the correlation coefficient between
countries’ sectoral product quality and GDP per capita
(both in logs) for three years. The last column is the av-
erage of correlation coefficients across years.
toral value added, respectively. Skill-intensity is the ratio of non-production workers
to total employment.33 All these statistics are measured using the U.S.’s industrial
data and averaged across 1995-2006. To prevent potential endogeneity, I also control
for countries’ openness and human capital which may affect sectoral product quality
and GDP per capita simultaneously.
As Table 12 shows, the coefficient of the interaction between investment-intensity
and GDP per capita is positive and significant, confirming the positive correlation
between sectoral quality and GDP per capita. Furthermore, it indicates that the
difference in product quality between rich and poor countries is more pronounced
in capital-intensive sectors. Similar results are also found for statistics of skill- and
33Skill intensity is first calculated using the 6-digit 1997 NAICS US’s industry data from Beck et al. (2013). The
results are then aggregated into 2-digit ISIC Rev3. level using the concordance table from Statistics Canada. When
aggregating, employment in the industry is taken as the weight. Finally, the skill intensity for each ISIC Rev3.
industry is averaged across 1995-2006.
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TABLE 12: How Sectoral Product Quality Relates to Sector Characteristics
ln(Quality) ln(Quality) ln(Quality) ln(Quality)
Investment Intensity -0.247 -0.172
(0.042)*** (0.06)***
Investment Intensity 0.015 0.012
*ln(GDP Per Capita) (0.004)*** (0.006)**
Skill Intensity -8.269 -4.74
(1.34)*** (2.097)**
Skill Intensity 0.527 0.429
*ln(GDP Per Capita) (0.134)*** (0.21)**
R&D Intensity -0.084 0.016
(0.018)*** (0.03)
R&D Intensity 0.004 -0.003
*ln(GDP Per Capita) (0.001)** (0.003)
R-Square 0.4 0.37 0.4 0.42
Observations 2640 2640 2640 2640
Note: Control variables include a set of country and year dummies; countries’ im-
port penetration rate, export share in production and the percentage of secondary
school completion in the population aged 15 and over. Standard errors clustered at
country*year are in parentheses. ***,** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significant
level, respectively.
R&D-intensity; however, the coefficient of the interaction term for R&D-intensity
turns insignificant in Table 12 when I include all these sectoral characteristics in the
analysis.34
3.6 Robustness
In Section 3.5.2, I notice that the value added deflator for the Electrical sector in
the U.S. and Sweden might have been quality-adjusted. Consequently, the TFP of
this sector will be over-estimated in these countries, whereas their product quality
in Electrical will be under-estimated. To see if countries’ estimated overall quality
and its ranking are sensitive to this potential bias, I re-present Table 8 with the
Electrical sector dropped.
34Beside clustered standard errors, I also employed robust and bootstrapped standard errors in the estimation,
and the estimated standard errors are quite similar to those in Table 12.
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As Table 13 shows, for most countries the rank of overall quality and its change
over time are quite similar to those in Table 8. However, for some countries, they are
decidedly different. For instance, the rank of Finland in rises from 18th to 12th when
the Electrical sector is dropped, while the Netherland’s rank in decreases from 5th
to 8th. As to changes in ranking over time, during 1995-2006, the rank of Austria
falls 13 places with Electrical dropped, compared to losing only 8 places in Table
8. Because the U.S.’s product quality in Electrical is potentially under-estimated,
its overall quality in 2006 rises from 8th to 5th with Electrical dropped. Meanwhile,
from 1995 to 2006, the U.S. gains 2 places in overall quality instead of losing 2 spots
as in Table 8.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper estimates countries’ sectoral product quality in a gravity model. The
estimation framework controls for the biases caused by selection into trade and firms’
heterogeneity, in light of Helpman et al. (2008). I also explicitly take into account
the heteroscedasticity of trade volume to estimate coefficients more efficiently. This
paper can be seen as a companion to Khandelwal (2010), who estimates product
quality at product level using a nested logit demand model. I assume that firms
are heterogeneous in quality, which makes it different from the work of Hallak and
Schott (2011), who assume uniform quality within the sector.
The estimated product quality confirms some findings of Hallak and Schott (2011).
For instance, product quality is positively correlated with countries’ income per
capita, and converging over time at a higher rate than the convergence in national
income. I also find that the quality gap between rich and poor countries is more
pronounced in capital- and skill- intensive sectors.
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TABLE 13: Robustness Check (Product Quality and its Rank of 19 Countries)
Demeaned Quality
Country 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006 Change
Germany 1.071 0.724 0.748 0.722 0.672 0.462 0.344 -0.727
France 0.739 0.614 0.558 0.469 0.520 0.501 0.536 -0.203
Netherlands 0.504 0.354 0.350 0.289 0.304 0.143 0.147 -0.356
Austria 0.426 0.124 0.042 -0.118 -0.222 -0.347 -0.433 -0.859
Italy 0.387 0.583 0.623 0.537 0.620 0.775 0.786 0.399
Spain 0.358 0.335 0.317 0.255 0.272 0.304 0.306 -0.051
United States 0.265 0.324 0.405 0.856 0.522 0.319 0.275 0.011
Denmark 0.209 0.082 0.119 0.093 0.170 0.167 0.243 0.034
United Kingdom 0.110 0.115 0.304 0.379 0.250 0.284 0.236 0.127
Finland -0.095 -0.049 -0.003 -0.089 -0.051 -0.031 -0.163 -0.068
Norway -0.129 0.069 0.060 -0.140 -0.154 -0.115 0.032 0.161
Canada -0.201 -0.190 -0.272 -0.172 -0.258 -0.124 -0.056 0.145
Sweden -0.268 0.017 -0.066 -0.055 -0.099 -0.105 -0.238 0.031
Slovenia -0.281 -0.627 -0.579 -0.574 -0.759 -0.504 -0.512 -0.231
Czech Republic -0.469 -0.472 -0.323 -0.228 -0.081 -0.005 -0.072 0.397
Portugal -0.483 -0.549 -0.465 -0.377 -0.355 -0.345 -0.241 0.241
Hungary -0.531 -0.593 -0.473 -0.418 -0.359 -0.161 -0.333 0.198
Greece -0.603 -0.396 -0.471 -0.742 -0.426 -0.454 -0.224 0.379
Slovak Republic -1.005 -0.463 -0.873 -0.688 -0.564 -0.764 -0.634 0.372
Rank
Country 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006 Change
Germany 1 1 1 2 1 3 3 -2
France 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 0
Netherlands 3 4 5 6 5 8 8 -5
Austria 4 7 10 11 13 16 17 -13
Italy 5 3 2 3 2 1 1 4
Spain 6 5 6 7 6 5 4 2
United States 7 6 4 1 3 4 5 2
Denmark 8 9 8 8 8 7 6 2
United Kingdom 9 8 7 5 7 6 7 2
Finland 10 12 11 10 9 10 12 -2
Norway 11 10 9 12 12 12 9 2
Canada 12 13 13 13 14 13 10 2
Sweden 13 11 12 9 11 11 14 -1
Slovenia 14 19 18 17 19 18 18 -4
Czech Republic 15 16 14 14 10 9 11 4
Portugal 16 17 15 15 15 15 15 1
Hungary 17 18 17 16 16 14 16 1
Greece 18 14 16 19 17 17 13 5
Slovak Republic 19 15 19 18 18 19 19 0
Note: Sectoral product quality (in logs) is first averaged for each country, weighted by the share of each sector
in the value added of total manufacturing; then subtracted by the annual mean of all countries’ overall product
quality. When calculating the overall quality indexes, electrical and optical equipment sector is excluded since
its quality might be under estimated for some countries. The countries are listed according to their ranks of
overall quality in 1995. The last column is the change of demeaned quality and its rank during 1995-2006.
60
Of course, this study is subject to several limitations. First, due to data availabil-
ity, I only estimate the product quality for 20 OECD countries. It will be interesting
to extend the analysis to more countries (especially developing ones), with access to
additional data in the future. Second, I assume a CES utility function in the model,
which yields constant markups across firms. A model allowing different markups for
firms with different quality will be intriguing and better compatible with the facts.
Third, if more gravity variables are possible, the estimated quality may be less noisy
and more useful.
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Chapter 4: Import Competition, R&D
and Quality Growth
4.1 Introduction
One outcome of economic growth is an increase of productivity. As new tech-
nologies are invented, we are able to produce more goods and services for a given
amount of inputs which results in a higher income per capita and living standard.
On the other hand, generally speaking, during the process of economic growth, we
are producing products of higher quality for several reasons. First, people would
like to consume more and higher quality goods as they become wealthier (see, for
example, Linder (1961) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011)). Second, firms might want to
upgrade their product quality as a strategy to cope with market competition (See,
for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991)).35
Empirically, there is a large literature investigating the evolution of productivity
at the country and sectoral levels, as well as the driving forces behind it.36 However,
because of the difficulties associated with measuring product quality, empirical re-
search evaluating the growth of quality is inadequate and investigation about what
drives the upgrading of quality is quite rare.
This paper contributes to the literature by empirically examining the effects of
import competition and domestic R&D on the growth of product quality using the
sector-level quality estimates in Chapter 3. As in Hallak and Schott (2011), I define
35Product quality can also be improved as a byproduct of workers’ investment in human capital (see, for example,
Stokey (1991)).
36Empirical analysis of productivity growth includes Baumol (1986) and Fare et al. (1994), among others. As to
the reasons behind the change of productivity, some other literature studies the effects of trade liberalization on
productivity, such as Bustos (2011), Bloom et al. (2011), and Acharya and Keller (2008), among others. There is
another strand of literature studying the effects of R&D on productivity growth, including Griliches (1994) and
Griffith et al (2004), among others.
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“quality” as any tangible or intangible non-price properties of a good which are
desired by consumers. Suppose that Goods A and B are of the same type and price,
but Good A has a larger market share than Good B. I assert that Good A has a
higher product quality than Good B.37
I find import competition significantly contributes to the growth of product qual-
ity, confirming the results of Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). In addition, I find that
research and development (R&D) and human capital have positive effects on quality
upgrading only through increasing the absorptive capacity of quality-lagged coun-
tries.
This paper relates to a strand of literature evaluating the growth of quality. For
instance, Bils and Klenow (2001) quantify the annual growth of quality of goods
in U.S. using the estimated “quality Engel curves.” In another paper, Bils (2004)
derives quality growth of durables from CPI data by studying consumers’ behavior
when they shift from old products to new substitutes. This study differs from theirs
in that I calculate the growth of quality directly by using the estimates of product
quality for different countries and sectors across years.
My analysis also relates to the literature that investigates the impact of trade on
quality upgrading. Eswaran and Kotwal (2007), Verhoogen (2008), and Fan et al.
(2013) develop models showing that trade liberalization induces firms to upgrade
their product quality.38 However, these studies suffer from a lack of data on reli-
able estimates of product qualities. An exception is Amiti and Khandelwal (2013),
37Under this broad definition of quality, the higher quality embedded in Good A may be due to technical reasons:
for example, Good A is more durable or has more functions than Good B. In other cases, the larger market share
and thus “quality” of Good A might be simply due to a more successful marketing strategy that shifts consumers’
preference toward Good A.
38In a similar way, Bustos (2011), Bloom et al. (2011), and Unel (2013) among many others have demonstrated
that trade liberalization enables firms to upgrade their technologies.
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who investigate firms’ quality upgrading upon an exogenous import tax cut using
product-level quality indexes. In this paper, I analyze the effect of an increase in
import penetration on quality growth using sectoral-level quality estimates from a
gravity equation. Although we use different methodologies and data sets, we arrive
at the same conclusion - import competition contributes to quality upgrading of
firms.
Finally, this paper contributes to the large theoretical literature on Research and
Development (R&D) and quality upgrading in economic growth. Indeed, the role
of R&D on quality upgrading is the hallmark of quality-ladder endogenous growth
models.39 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to extract quality
indexes and relate them to R&D investment and human capital.
4.2 Related Literature
Theoretical literature in international trade often asserts that trade liberalization
can help improve the product quality of the country. For example, Eswaran and
Kotwal (2007) argue that free trade can improve welfare in developing countries
by increasing the quality of goods they produce. In another influential paper, Ver-
hoogen (2008) models quality upgrading as a reaction of more productive firms to
an exogenous currency devaluation. More recently, Fan et al. (2013) sets up a model
with heterogeneous firms where firms’ product quality is endogenous. When there is
a decrease in tariffs, firms respond by choosing higher quality if they are heteroge-
nous in quality. In an attempt to explain the increase in skill-premium shortly after
trade liberalization, Eslava et al. (2012) build a model where firms invest in quality
upgrading technologies when they face import competition.
However, due to a lack of quality estimates, empirical evidence about how trade
liberalization affects quality upgrading is inadequate. Amiti and Khandelwal (2013)
39The literature on this subject is vast. See Aghion and Howitt (2006) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
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first provide evidence that import competition increases the rate at which product
quality is upgraded.40 This paper is the second to present evidence that import
competition contributes to quality upgrading. Although we use quality estimates
from different models, the conclusion is the same - import competition contributes
to quality upgrading.
As to the relationship between R&D and quality growth, Flam and Helpman
(1987) theoretically explore how R&D and technological progress in South stimu-
late the upgrading of product quality in North. In Arnold and Kornprobst (2008),
sectoral R&D investment directly increases the highest quality level in the sector.
Lambertini and Orsini (2010) also model the upgrading of product quality as the
result of domestic R&D investment.
Empirically, Faruq (2010) analyzes the quality of goods imported by the US and
finds that goods from countries with more intensive R&D investment tend to be of
higher quality. Johansson (2007) also documents that Swedish regions with easier
access to R&D resources have a comparative advantage in producing quality goods.
In another study using micro-data of a panel of Chinese steel producers, Fisher-
Vanden and Terry (2009) find that technologies acquired from foreign countries
have to be combined with domestic R&D to improve the product quality of those
firms.
However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no literature empirically testing
the role of domestic R&D investment in the upgrading of sectoral product quality.
This paper attempts to bridge that gap since I have quality estimates sector by
sector and year by year.
40In a related paper, David (2011) analyzes the improvement of product quality for a panel of Spanish manufac-
turing firms when they confront an exogenous increase in market competition.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data used
in the analysis. Section 4.3 specifies the empirical models for the analysis. Section




This section provides an overview of the data employed in my analysis. Appendix
C provides details about data sources and the construction of variables. I use several
data sources to construct country- and industry-level data.
The data on value added, import penetration, R&D intensity, and the ratio of
export to output at the sectoral level come from the Structural Analysis (STAN)
database, OECD (2008a). I use the business enterprise R&D expenditure data from
OECD (2012) for sectoral R&D investment. The sectoral value added and R&D
investment data are all transformed into 2000 U.S. dollars. A human capital mea-
surement at the sectoral level wouldl be more appropriate for this study; however, I
cannot find such comparable data covering those countries and sectors of interest.
I thus use the percentage of secondary school completion in the population ages 15
and above to represent human capital at the country level, which is drawn from
Barro and Lee (2013). Finally, I take the quality estimates from Chapter 3 as the
proxy for countries’ product quality (in logs) at sector level during 1995-2006.
Constrained by the availability of data, I construct a panel data set on twelve
manufacturing industries in twenty countries between 1995 and 2006. The countries
are Austria (AUT), Canada (CAN), the Czech Republic (CZE), Germany (DEU),
Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), the United Kingdom
(GBR), Greece (GRC), Hungary (HUN), Italy (ITA), the Netherlands (NLD), Nor-
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way (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Portugal (PRT), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN),
Sweden (SWE), and the United States (USA). The twelve manufacturing sectors are
at the two-digit ISIC level: food products and beverage (ISIC 15); textile products,
leather and footwear (ISIC 17T19); wood and products of wood and cork (ISIC
20); pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing (ISIC 21T22); chemicals
and chemical products (ISIC 24); rubber and plastics products (ISIC 25); other
non-metallic mineral products (ISIC 26); basic metals (ISIC 27); fabricated metal
products, except machinery and equipment (ISIC 28); machinery and equipment
(ISIC 29); electrical and optical equipment (ISIC 30T33); and transport equipment
(ISIC 34T35).
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 14 presents descriptive statistics for the manufacturing sectors of 20 OECD
countries. Excepting countries’ overall quality index in 1995, all other variables are
averaged across 1995-2006. Columns 2-3 measure the openness of the manufacturing
of these countries, where the Netherlands, Denmark and Slovakia have the highest
openness.41 R&D intensity in Column 4 is defined as the ratio of total business re-
search and development expenditure to the manufacturing value added. The data on
human capital are from Barro and Lee (2013), which is measured by the percentage
of secondary school completion in the population aged 15 and above. Not surpris-
ingly, Sweden, France, and the U.S. devote the greatest fraction of output into R&D;
however it is interesting that Czech Republic and Slovenia have the highest average
human capital level.
41Export/Production is the share of export value in sectoral production. Import penetration is defined as the































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The share of Y in sample in Table 14 is the manufacturing value added of each
country as a fraction of total value added of all countries in the sample. Similarly,
the share of R&D in the sample is the proportion of business R&D expenditure
of each country in total R&D expenditure of the sample. They show that U.S.,
Germany, and France produced most of the outputs and conducted most of R&D
activities in the sample. The last column presents countries’ average growth rate of
demeaned overall quality during 1995-2006. Compared with countries’ overall quality
index (demeaned) in 1995, it indicates overall quality convergence across countries.
For example, Germany had the highest quality in 1995 but underwent nearly the
biggest decrease in relative quality during the period.
Table 15 presents the descriptive statistics for the twelve sectors. The export
ratio in production, import penetration, and R&D intensity in Columns 2-4 are
first averaged across countries at each year, and then averaged across years. They
show that on average, Electrical, Textile, and Transport equipment are the sectors
with the greatest openness, while Electrical, Chemical, and Transport equipment
are most intensively engaged in R&D activities.
To measure the share of Y and R&D in sample in Table 15, I first calculate each
sector’s share of value added and R&D expenditure in the whole manufacturing of
the country, and then average the shares across countries at each year. Finally, I
average the shares of each sector across years to get the statistics in Columns 5-6.
Thus, on average, Food, Electrical, and Paper are the largest sectors in terms of their
shares of value added in the country, whereas most R&D activities are conducted
in sectors of Chemicals, Transport equipment, and Machinery. The last column of











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































within the sector at each year. It shows that for most sectors there exists a conver-
gence in product quality across countries, which is discussed in Chapter 3.
4.4 Empirical Specification
4.4.1 Import Competition and Quality Growth
Although much theoretical research concludes that trade liberalization contributes
to firms’ quality upgrading, Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) are the first to empiri-
cally show that import competition increases the rate at which product quality is
upgraded.42 To see if their results are replicated in this study, in Figure 5, I graph the
change of import penetration in the whole manufacturing as well as overall product
quality from 1995 to 2006 for four countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
and Slovenia). It is evident that after 2002, when they became eligible to join the
European Union, both their import penetration and overall product quality grow at
a higher speed than before.43
To formally test if import competition increases countries’ product quality in this
study, I set up the specification as follows:
∆nln(Quality)ist = β1∆nImport Peneist + β2∆nImport Peneist ∗ Upperis,t−n
+ β3Demeaned Qualityis,t−n + κXis + αi + αzt + εist, (44)
where ∆n is the difference between a variable and its n-period-lagged value. Import Peneist
is the rate of import penetration in sector s of country i at year t. Upperist is a
dummy indicating whether the product quality of the sector lies in the upper half
at year t. Xis is a set of other control variables, including Hi,t−n, R&Dis,t−n and
42In another paper, David (2011) analyzes the improvement of product quality for a panel of Spanish manufac-
turing firms when they confront an exogenous increase in market competition.
43Although the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia were officially admitted to the EU in 2004, they
were actually eligible to join the EU in 2002 by the Copenhagen European Council. I therefore prefer 2002 as the
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Note: Quality and export are in logs, and logged export value is demeaned by the average 
during 1995−2006. Import penetration is in percentage. Vertical dash line indicates 2002.
All Manufacturing
Import penetration, Quality and Export
FIGURE 5: The Change of Quality for Four Countries When Accepted to EU
R&D intenis,t−n. Hit is the percentage of secondary school completion in the popu-
lation aged 15 and over. R&Dist and R&D intenist are enterprise R&D expenditure
and sectoral R&D intensity, respectively.
In this specification, I expect β1 to be positive if an increase in import penetration
has a positive impact on the growth of product quality.44 Empirical research (see,
e.g., Acharya and Keller (2008)) suggests that more advanced technologies will spill
over to less developed countries and thus increase their productivity when they
import from developed countries. I hypothesize that this result is also true for quality
upgrading and expect β2 to be negative if quality-lagged countries have an extra
source of quality growth via the “technology spillover effect”. β3 captures the quality
convergence effect, and should be negative.
44Note that there is another theoretical possibility - higher product quality may deter the competition from abroad
and thus decrease the import penetration. If this is true, however, the estimated β1 will be even under estimated.
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αi is the country fixed effect. In order to control for in-period exogenous shocks to
countries which cannot be captured by αi, I include Hit, R&Dist and R&D intenist
in the specification.45 Finally, since in this paper product quality is estimated sepa-
rately sector by sector and year by year, the estimated quality indexes might have
absorbed sector-specific shocks each year. I thus include a sector*year fixed effect,
αzt, in the specification.
4.4.2 Domestic R&D and Quality Upgrading
This subsection specifies the empirical model to test the role of domestic R&D in
sectoral quality upgrading.
I assume that product quality is a function of knowledge stock, G, i.e., λ = f(G).
Taking the logarithm of both sides and differentiating with respect to time, the
growth of quality is found to relate to the change of G, which equals to R&D
expenditure, R.46 That is, ∆ln(Quality) = ρeλyR/Y , where ρ ≡ dY/dG is the
return rate of R&D to output, eλy ≡ (dλ/dY )Y/λ is the elasticity of product quality








+ γXis,t−1 + εist, (45)
where φ ≡ ρeλy, and Xist is a set of other control variables.
Before regression, three additional components are added to the basic specifica-
tion above. First, Stokey (1991) argues that human capital is an important deter-
minant of product quality. I thus add a proxy for human capital in (45) to test
45It seems better to include country*year fixed effect in the specification instead of adding Hit, R&Dist and
R&D intenist. However, this will cause a parameter proliferation problem if the size of data is not sufficiently large.
46Following Griffith et al. (2004), I assume that compared to R&D investment, the depreciation of knowledge
stock is negligible.
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its role in quality upgrading. Second, Griffith et al. (2004) find that technologies
transferred from advanced countries can promote the TFP growth of less developed
ones. I also incorporate a “technology spillover effect” into (45), hypothesizing that
technologies spilled from the quality frontiers facilitate quality upgrading in quality-
lagged countries and make an extra source of quality growth that is compatible with
the quality convergence phenomenon.47 Third, suggested by the empirical work of
Fisher-Vanden and Terry (2009), I introduce “absorptive capacity” to the basic
specification, assuming that technologies transferred have to be complemented by
domestic R&D and human capital to be effective in quality upgrading. Consequently,
the augmented specification takes the following form:













∗ Loweris,t−1 ∗ λDMis,t−1
+ δ3Hi,t−1 ∗ Loweris,t−1 ∗ λDMis,t−1 + γXis,t−1 + εist, (46)
where Hit is the percentage of secondary school completion in the population aged
15 and over (Barro and Lee, forthcoming); Lowerist is a dummy indicating whether
the quality of sector s in country i is below the annual mean at year t; λDMist is
the demeaned product quality (in logs); Xis,t−1 is a set of other control variables
including import penetration and the fraction of export in sectoral output; and αt
and αis are year and country*sector fixed effects, respectively.
In (46), φ1 and φ2 capture the direct effects of R&D and human capital on quality
upgrading. δ1 reflects the technology spillover effect, and should be positive. The two
interaction terms capture the absorptive capacity of quality-lagged countries, which
47Beside technology transfer, the import of high-quality intermediate goods from advanced countries also benefits
the quality upgrading of quality-lagged countries, which also drives quality convergence.
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is supposed to correlate positively with domestic R&D expenditures and human
capital. Because countries with quality estimates less than the annual mean will
have negative demeaned quality indexes, λDMist , I expect δ2 and δ3 to be negative if
absorptive capacity facilitates quality upgrading.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Import Competition and Quality Growth
Table 16 reports the results when regressing (44). The second column presents
the results when regressors are only the increase in sectoral import penetration and
the lagged product quality (demeaned) at sector level. The estimated β1 is 0.0038
and statistically different from zero, which means that for a one-percent increase
in the rate of import penetration, sectoral product quality will increase by 0.38%.
The coefficient of lagged demeaned quality is significantly negative, reflecting the
convergence in product quality. In Column 3, an interaction term is added into the
regression to capture different effects for countries with different quality. The esti-
mated β2 is negative and significant at the 10% level, implying that for the same
increase in import competition, the growth of product quality for quality-leading
countries will be less than quality-lagged countries. This can be interpreted by the
fact that developing countries can benefit from the spilled technologies and high-
quality intermediate goods when they import from developed countries, and thus
have extra sources of quality upgrading.48 There is a literature (e.g., Acharya and
Keller (2008)) showing that the new technologies spilled from developed countries
via import contribute to productivity growth in developing countries. This study
complements that literature by demonstrating that the “spillover effect” also facili-
tates quality upgrading in quality lagged countries.
48Another possibility is that for the same amount of increase in import penetration, firms in quality-leading
countries will face less competition pressure since their product quality is greater than that of incomers. Thus, it is
less pressing to upgrade their product quality.
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Theoretically, if omitted variables correlate with the change of import penetration
and quality growth simultaneously, the estimated coefficients in Column 3 will be
biased. One ideal approach to deal with this problem is to find a valid instrument
for the increase in import penetration; however, I can’t find such instruments in this
study. Instead, I add all possible omitted variables into the regression to solve this
problem. The results in Column 4 are quite similar to Column 3 except that the
impact of import competition on quality upgrading has been increased by nearly
50%.
Columns 5-6 report the results when I consider quality growth over 3-year inter-
vals. Generally, the results are similar to those for 1-year intervals in Columns 2-3.
When more control variables are added, the estimated β1 in Column 6 is again about
40% greater than that in Column 5. However, it is important to bear in mind that
on the one hand, an increase in import competition will force firms to upgrade their
product quality to compete against new comers from abroad. On the other hand,
quality growth also has a role in changing import competition - higher product qual-
ity will deter the entrance of competitors from abroad, and thus lower the increase
of import penetration. Thus, if I interpret the estimated β1 in Table 16 as the ef-
fect of import competition upon quality upgrading, they will be under-estimated.
Nevertheless, one can think of the estimated β1 as the lower bound of that impact.
There is a significant literature empirically analyzing the relationship between ex-
port and productivity. For instance, Bernard (2004) demonstrates that the sectoral
export level in the U.S. positively correlates with the productivity of the sector.
However, empirical research about the relationship between export and product
quality is limited. The theoretical model in this paper predicts that for a given sec-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































implying that a larger fraction of firms in the sector will engage in export. The
last column in Table 16 tests this prediction empirically, and it confirms that for a
given sector, countries with higher sectoral quality usually export a larger portion
of production.
4.5.2 R&D and Quality Growth
Table 17 reports the results when I empirically estimate (46). The second column
analyzes the effect of sectoral R&D investment on the growth of product quality at
the sectoral level where control variables include only the rate of import penetration
and the fraction of export in sectoral output. The estimated coefficient of lagged
sectoral R&D intensity is 0.42 with a standard error of 0.19, implying that if one
more percent of sectoral outputs are used in R&D investment, the product quality
at sector level will be increased by over 0.4 percent.
In Column 3, I add a dummy indicating whether the estimated quality of the
country is below the average of all quality estimates at that year. Its estimated coef-
ficient is positive and statistically different from zero, meaning that the “technology
spillover effect” in the literature (see, e.g., Griffith et al. (2004)) also facilitates the
quality upgrading in developing countries. It is also compatible with the quality
convergence phenomenon observed in Chapter 3.
Column 4 adds an interaction term into the regression to reflect “the absorptive
capacity” of developing countries (see, e.g., Griffith et al. (2004) and Fisher-Vanden
and Terry (2009)). The basic idea is that technologies spilled from developed coun-
tries have to be combined with R&D investment to effectively facilitate TFP or
quality growth. I assume that countries with lower sectoral product quality will
potentially receive more new technologies spilled from developed countries. Then
Quality Demeanedist in the interaction term negatively correlates with the spilled
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technologies, and the interaction term itself will negatively relate to counties’ ab-
sorptive capacity as well. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is negative
and significant, implying that R&D investment contributes to developing countries’
quality upgrading via increasing their absorptive capacity.
However, the coefficient of lagged R&D intensity in Column 4 turns insignificant
when the interaction term is added in the regression. This is because with the
interaction term, the identification of that coefficient will depend on countries whose
sectoral product quality is greater than the annual mean. Those countries with
relatively high product quality in the sample are the most developed, whose sectoral
R&D intensity and quality growth are both close to each other. Thus, with limited
variation in dependent and independent variables, the coefficient of lagged R&D
intensity will not be successfully identified.
Column 5 investigates the contribution of human capital upon quality growth. It
shows that countries’ human capital level significantly facilitates the upgrading of
sectoral product quality. Meanwhile, the effect of spilled technologies on develop-
ing countries’ quality upgrading is confirmed again. Human capital is also found to
facilitate the quality upgrading in quality-lagged countries via increasing their ab-
sorptive capacity. Column 6 puts R&D intensity and human capital in the regression
simultaneously, and the coefficients of them are insignificant. However, their posi-
tive role in quality upgrading via the absorptive capacity is again confirmed, and
the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms are very close to the estimates in
Column 4 and 5.
Finally, in a study of productivity, Fadinger and Fleiss (2011) find that sec-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































column of Table 17 shows that a positive correlation also exists between sectoral
R&D and the product quality of the sector.
4.6 Robustness
This section provides some robustness check for the analysis in Section 4.5. Table
18 examines the relationship between import competition and the growth of prod-
uct quality over 5-year intervals. Again, import competition is found to facilitate
the quality upgrading at the sectoral level. When additional control variables are
included, the estimated β1 in Column 4 is over 50% higher than the coefficient in
Column 3, which is similar to the findings in Table 16 with 1- and 3-year lags.
However, the magnitude of the effect is about 64% of that with 3-year lag, which
is again 72% of the effect with 1-year lag, implying that the positive impact of im-
port competition on quality upgrading is more substantial over short periods. One
possible explanation is that over long-run, firms may resort to alternative strate-
gies rather than upgrading their product quality to cope with the competition from
abroad. The spilled technologies from quality frontiers are also found to facilitate
the quality growth in developing countries in Column 4.
In Chapter 3, I notice that the value added deflator for the Electrical sector in
the U.S. and Sweden might have been quality-adjusted. Consequently, the TFP of
this sector will be over-estimated in these countries, whereas their product quality
will be under-estimated. To see if the results in Table 16 and 17 are sensitive to this
potential bias, I re-analyze the effects of import competition and domestic R&D
investment upon the growth of sectoral product quality with the data of Electrical
dropped.
Table 19 reports the results when regressing (44) with the Electrical sector omit-
ted. It is interesting to notice that the estimated β1 in each column of Table 19
is very close to those in Table 16. The convergence effects, i.e. the coefficients of
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TABLE 18: Openness and Product Quality With 5-year Lag
∆5ln(Quality) ∆5ln(Quality) ∆5ln(Quality)
∆5Import 0.0015 0.0025 0.0038
Penetration (0.0006)** (0.001)** (0.0014)***
Interaction(-5) -0.0013 -0.0028
(0.001) (0.001)*
Demeaned -0.525 -0.518 -0.472




Sector*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1530 1530 1038
Note: ∆5 means the difference between a variable and its 5-period-lagged value. Interaction(-
5) is defined as ∆5Import Penetrationist ∗ Upperis,t−5, where Upperist is a dummy indi-
cating if the product quality of country i in sector s is above the mean of all countries’ at
year t. Other control variables include the percentage of secondary school completion in the
population aged 15 and over; business enterprise R&D expenditure in each industry; and
sectoral R&D intensity. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***,** and * represent
1%, 5% and 10% significant level, respectively.
lagged demeaned quality in Table 19, are also very similar to the estimates in Table
16. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms in Table 19 turn insignificant
when the sector of Electrical is deleted from the sample. This implies that the sector
of Electrical is one of the places where most of the technology spillover is taking
place. This makes sense since according to Table 15, the sector of Electrical has the
greatest openness (measured by Export/Production and Import penetration) and
R&D intensity.
Table 20 analyzes the contribution of domestic R&D investment upon the up-
grading of sectoral product quality when the Electrical sector is dropped from the
sample. It is surprising that most of the estimated coefficients in Table 20 are very
close to those in Table 17 with the full sample. This means that the demonstrated
effects of R&D investment and human capital upon sectoral quality growth via the
absorptive capacity are not caused by potential under-estimation of product quality
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper investigates the effects of import competition and domestic R&D in-
vestment on the upgrading of sectoral product quality using the sectoral level quality
estimates from Chapter 3.
This is the second paper empirically examining the impact of import competi-
tion on quality growth.49 Although we use different methodologies and data sets, we
arrive at the same conclusion - an increase in import competition will force firms
to upgrade their product quality to cope with competition from abroad. Another
finding is that new technologies spilled from developed countries facilitate qual-
ity upgrading in developing countries, which adds to the literature of technology
spillover in economic development (see, e.g., Acharya and Keller (2008)).
This paper also empirically relates domestic R&D investment to the growth of
sectoral product quality. I find that both R&D investment and human capital con-
tribute to the growth of quality at sector level via increasing the absorptive capacity
of developing countries. This result is consistent with the findings of Griffith et al.
(2004) and Fisher-Vanden and Terry (2009).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This dissertation includes three papers discussing technology, international trade,
and economic development. The first paper examines optimal intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection for developing countries attempting to change the direc-
tion of technical progress to suit their needs. The other two papers present a new
approach to estimate countries’ product quality at the sectoral level and investi-
gate the contributions of import competition and domestic R&D investment to the
upgrading of product quality.
The first paper is motivated by the work of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), where
technical innovation only happens in North, while South imitates the technologies
for a small cost. However, the newly-developed technologies are solely based on
the skill endowment in North and not appropriate for the needs of South, since
the latter is more low-skill labor abundant. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) did not
provide a solution for this typical technology-skill mismatch problem, and Chapter
2 of this dissertation tries to fill this gap by putting forward a sector-differentiated
IPR protection for developing countries.
The intuition is quite straightforward to follow. When South sets up IPR laws to
protect innovators in North, the innovation there will consider the needs of South,
since there is a market incentive. The crucial point of this paper is that the IPR
protection in South may be sector-differentiated. In autarky, the low-skill intensive
sector in South should receive more IPR protection. Then, innovators in North will
be induced to invent more low-skill technologies when they can extract more rent
from the low-skill intensive sector of South. Consequently, innovation in North will
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better match the skill endowment in South, and South’s income per capita will
increase. More interestingly, I show that under free trade of final goods between
North and South, IPR protection in the low-skill intensive sector of South does not
necessarily exceed its high-skill sector, which implies that international trade can
help South overcome the technology-skill mismatch problem.
Technical progress leads to higher product quality, and product quality is an im-
portant variable in the study of international trade and economic growth. However,
people usually use the prices of exported goods as a proxy for their quality due to
the lack of reasonable quality estimates. This approach is not without its drawbacks,
and Chapter 3 adds to the literature by directly estimating the product quality at
the sector level for twelve manufacturing sectors in twenty OECD countries.
The estimation begins with a quality-heterogeneity model of trade which is an
extension of the work by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011). I then derive a gravity
equation from the theoretical model. Finally, as Hallak and Schott (2011) do, I
identify product quality as an unexplained part of export value when trade frictions,
input costs, productivity, etc. are controlled.
I find that the estimated quality levels vary substantially across countries and
over time. Another finding is that as in Hallak and Schott (2011), there is a positive
correlation between countries’ product quality and their per-capita income. How-
ever, because countries’ product quality is converging at a higher speed than the
convergence in national income, the correlation is weakening over time. Lastly, the
quality gap between rich and poor countries is more pronounced in capital- and
skill-intensive sectors.
Chapter 4 in this dissertation examines the contributions of import competition
and R&D investment to the growth of sectoral product quality using the qual-
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ity estimates from Chapter 3. I find that import competition significantly leads to
the upgrading of product quality, confirming the findings of Amiti and Khandel-
wal (2013). I also find that new technologies spilled from developed countries will
facilitate quality upgrading in developing countries.
Regarding the role of domestic R&D investment in upgrading sectoral product
quality, I find that both R&D investment and human capital contribute to the
growth of quality at the sectoral level by increasing the absorptive capacity of de-
veloping countries, confirming the findings of Fisher-Vanden and Terry (2009).
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2
Since the welfare function (16) is an increasing function of the total output Yt,
maximizing it subject to given g and Nt is equivalent to maximizing the total output
Y St .
50 Perfect competition in the production of final goods implies that the output
value of final goods is the sum of output value of the two sectors. It then follows
from (10) that











where I dropped the time index to simplify the notation.










Let NL/NH = x, then NL = xN/(1 +x) and NH = N/(1 +x), where N = NL +NH











where a = LS/HS. Note that Y S is a concave function of x over the domain [0,+∞),











as also indicated by equation (17).
50Equations in (14) indicate that the growth rate g is a function of NL/NH . But notice from Figure 1 that one
can keep g constant by choosing κL and κH appropriately. In other words, one can get any NL/NH by choosing
κL and κH in such a way that g remains constant. Consequently, in the optimization problem, one can treat g as
given.
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which together with (10) implies that the contribution of each intermediate good to
GDP in the low-skill sector is the same as that in the high-skill sector.
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Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1
As discussed in Appendix A, maximizing the welfare function (16) is equivalent to
maximize the total output in the South
Y S = (PWL )
1
1−βNLL

































Let x ≡ NL/NH and ã ≡ (LS +LN)/(HS +HN). Using these together with (51a)
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where ã ≡ (LS + LN)/(HS +HN).
Note that when ãx > (LS/HS)1+(1−β)(ε−1), using (51a) and (51b) implies that
(PWL )
1
1−βLS 6 (PWH )
1
1−βHS. Since LS/HS > ã, it then follows that dY S/dx < 0.
On the other hand, when x 6 ã(1−β)(ε−1), equation (51b) implies that (PWH )
1−ε 6















Since Y S(x) is continuous in its domain [0,+∞), the above analysis ensures that
there exists an x∗ such that ã1+(1−β)(ε−1) < ãx∗ < (LS/HS)1+(1−β)(ε−1), and x∗
maximizes the total output in South. Using the last inequality for x∗ together with
















Data Description and the Sample of Countries
C1, Data for the Calculation of Ais and cis
I have complete data for only twenty OECD countries. Limited by this data
availability, I can only estimate sectoral product quality for these 20 countries during
1995-2006.
Sectoral productivity, Ais is measured as the Solow residuals. For this purpose, I
make use of the sectoral data of current value added, value added deflator, current
fixed capital formation, gross fixed capital formation deflator, and total employment.
All these data are from the STAN database, OECD (2008a). Real output is measured
by sectoral real value added in 2000 U.S. dollars. I first use the value added deflator
to convert current value added into the real one in 2000 local currency, which is
then transformed into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in 2000. In the same
way, the sectoral fixed capital formation data (current) is also transformed into the
real one in 2000 U.S. dollars. When the fixed capital formation deflator is missing
for some sectors, the deflator for the whole manufacture will be used instead.51 The
real capital stock is then calculated using the perpetual inventory method:
Kis,t+1 = (1− δ)Kis,t + Iis,t, (53)
where Kis,t and Iis,t are the real capital stock and fixed capital formation, respec-
tively, and δ is the depreciation rate. The initial capital stock is estimated as follows:
51For some countries, the deflator for the whole manufacture is still missing for some years. In this case, I get
the aggregate gross fixed capital formation deflator for the whole economy from the World Development Indicators
(WDI). The base year of this deflator is then changed to 2000, and I use it to fill the missing deflators. The involved
countries include Denmark (1991-1992), Hungary (1991-1994), New Zealand (1991-2006), Portugal (1995-1999),






where gis is the average growth rate of the real fixed capital formation during 1991-
2006. Following Unel (2008), I choose 8% as the depreciation rate.
Considering the difference in daily working hours across countries (Unel, 2008), I
multiply sectoral employment data by the average annual working hours per worker,
and take it as the labor input. The data of average annual hours worked per employee
are available from the labor force statistics, OECD (2012).52 In light of Harrigan
(1997) and Unel (2008), I estimate the labor share, 1−βis, by running the following
regression:






where αist is the share of labor compensation in the value added of sector s in
country i at year t. Kist is the real capital stock and List is total working hours. The
predicted αist is used as the estimate of 1−βis at year t. As Unel (2008) points out,
this estimator is advantageous in that it is less noisy and less likely to exceed one.







where Qis is the real value added in that sector.
To calculate cis in (29), I need the data of interest rate (or the rental price of
capital) ri, and the wage rate wi. The wage rate is calculated as the labor compen-
sation of the whole manufacture divided by the total manufacturing working hours.
It is then transformed into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate of that year.
52Slovenia lacks average annual hours worked per employee data during 1995-1999. I extrapolate the missing data
by the average of 2000-2002, since the change of this data during that time was negligible.
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Following Caselli and Feyrer (2007) and Fadinger and Fleiss (2011), the rental





where βi is the capital share in national income of country i, which is one minus the
labor share. The share of labor is calculated as the total labor compensation of the
economy divided by total value added, which is then averaged across 1995-2006. The
total labor compensation and value added data are from OECD (2008a). GDPi is
from the WDI, in current U.S. dollars. Ki is estimated using the perpetual inventory
method. For this purpose, I use the gross fixed capital investment volume data from
the WDI; the depreciation rate is set to 8%, and the initial year is 1985.53 The real
capital stock data is then transformed into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in
2000.
To estimate the product quality, I still need estimates of sectoral elasticity of sub-
stitution, εs, which cannot directly be estimated in this paper. I draw on estimates
from Imbs and Mejean (2009), who first calculate sectoral elasticity of substitution
on the basis of 3-digit ISIC Rev.3. I then calculate the elasticity for each 2-digit
ISIC Rev.3 industry by averaging the elasticities of the 3-digit industries below it.
The elasticities for 2-digit industries are again averaged to get the sectoral elasticity
of substitution if the sector consists of two or more 2-digit industries.54
53The base year is 2000; and it is in local currency units.
54Some other studies provide the estimates of sectoral elasticity of substitution at the Standard International
Trade Classification (SITC) 2-digit level (Hummels, 1999), or SITC 5-digit level (Broda and Weinstein, 2006). So
far, however, there is no reliable correspondence table between SITC and ISIC Rev.3, which makes Imbs and Mejean
(2009) the only source from which to get the sectoral elasticity of substitution on the basis of ISIC Rev.3.
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C2, Data for the Extensive and Intensive Analysis
I extract the export data from the UN Comtrade database via the World Integrated
Trade Solution (WITs). The export data are based on the ISIC Rev.3 2-digit industry
classification, which are summed when the sector consists of two or more 2-digit
industries. Comtrade claims that the import data might be more accurate than the
export data because the value of import is used by governments to calculate customs
duty. The import data, however, cannot be used in this study, because the countries
who report their imports are too few, especially in the first portion of 1995-2006.
Some of these twenty countries of interest might export to all the countries that
report imports; consequently, the fixed effects of these countries cannot be estimated
in the extensive analysis. To mitigate the measurement error, I first choose the
sample of exporting countries to be the 85 countries that did not report their exports
at least once during 1995-2006.55 These countries are generally more important in
the world economy and their export data is of higher quality. Second, I drop the
export records whose value is less than the 15th percentile of US’s export records
in that sector in 2000.56 This helps reduce the measurement error, since the least
important small exports are more likely to be inaccurately reported.57
55See Appendix E for the list of these countries.
56When cleaning the UN Comtrade data (1984-2000), Feenstra et al. (2005) drop the trade flow of a SITC Rev.2
4-digit industry if it is less than 100,000 US dollars. My data cleaning is less stringent than theirs. For example,
Sector ISIC15 has 17 4-digit industries. If the 4-digit ISIC Rev.3 industry classification is comparable to the 4-digit
SITC one, according to the standard of Feenstra et al. (2005), the cutoff value will be 1,700,000 US dollars. The
15th percentile of US exports in that sector, however, is only 289,000 US dollars in 2000. I also tried different cutoff
values, and the results are quite similar.
57Another reason for this treatment is that I need zero exports when I analyze the selection into trade. If some
country exports to (or imports from) nearly all other countries, then its exporter (importer) fixed effect will not be
accurately estimated. Neither will its sectoral product quality. If there are not enough zero trade flows, this problem
will be more severe when I use the bootstrap method to estimate the standard errors of product quality estimates.
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The bilateral tariff data are from the TRAINS database, via the WITs. The tariff
is based on the ISIC Rev.3 2-digit industry level, which is then weight-averaged to
the sectoral level if the sector consists of two or more 2-digit industries. The weight is
the import value of the industry. The tariff used is the Most-Favored Nation (MFN)
tariff, which is further adjusted by any possible preferential rates between the trade
pair. The number of countries reporting their import tariffs is growing over time, but
in the early stage of 1995-2006, not many did. Thus, if I use all the available tariff
data, the sample of importing countries will be subject to constant change and the
estimates will be biased if the selection into reporting the tariff is not random.58 To
minimize this problem, I limit the sample of importing countries to the 48 countries
who missed at most 2 years’ tariff during 1995-2006, when analyzing the intensive
margin.59 I then extrapolate the missing tariff data by the average of neighboring
two years’. The potential harm of this treatment is minimal, since in most cases the
change of tariff over time is rather slow, but the benefit is that it helps keep the
sample of importing countries large enough for analysis.
I extract other gravity variables from various sources. The bilateral distance data
are from the CEPII database, which first calculates the distance between cities, and
then averages the distances weighted by the proportion of cities’ population in the
whole country (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). Other dichotomous variables from the
CEPII database include: if the two countries share a common border, if they share
the same official language, if they have the same legal origin, and if they have some
58The countries who import more are more likely to report their tariff earlier and more consistently.
59See Appendix E for the list of these countries. The number of countries who consistently report their tariffs
during 1995-2006 is few, while the extensive analysis needs the sample of importing countries as big as possible to
produce enough zero trade flows. I thus cannot use the tariff data in the extensive analysis. This leads to the sample
of importing countries in the extensive analysis different from the intensive analysis.
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colonial relationship (including if they are in colonial relationship post 1945; if they
have the same colonizer post 1945; and if they were ever in colonial relationship).
The data indicating if the trade pair shares the same currency and if they are
both in some free trade agreements (FTA) are from De Sousa (2012). I also draw
on Helpman et al. (2008) to get the dummies showing if the pair of countries are
both islands or landlocked. Helpman et al. (2008) provide an exclusion variable for
the extensive analysis, i.e., the religion of the trade pair. When constructing this
variable, they first multiply one country’s proportion of some religion in the popula-
tion by the other country’s, and then add it across different regions (e.g., Protestant,
Catholic, Muslim, etc.). In this paper, I create an additional exclusion variable, Eco-
nomic Freedom, using the Index of Economic Freedom database from the Heritage
Foundation. It is a dummy indicating if both the exporting and importing country
have an overall economic freedom score higher than the median of the sample.
C3, The Sample of Countries in the Analysis
For the extensive analysis, I would like to include as many countries as possible in
the sample. Then there will be enough zero trade flows and it is less likely that some
country exports to (or imports from) all other countries, which leads to the situation
where the exporting (importing) country fixed effect cannot be precisely estimated.
However, I cannot take all available countries in the sample, since the number of
countries who report their exports is increasing over time, which would cause a
sample selection problem. I thus include 82 countries in the sample of exporting
countries, who failed to report at most one year’s data during 1995-2006. The sample
size of importing countries is 155, which is dictated by the availability of the Index
of Economic Freedom data.
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When performing the intensive analysis, the sample of exporting countries is the
same as that in the extensive analysis. Because I make use of tariff data in the
intensive analysis, the sample of importing countries consists of only 47 nations
whose tariff data are missing for at most 2 years during 1995-2006.




D1, The Calculation of E [uijs|Eijs = 1]
Rewrite (39) as zijs = [.] + vijs, then Eijs = 1 implies that zijs = [.] + vijs > 0.


































where ρ is the correlation coefficient between uijs and vijs.
D2, The Calculation of E [ψijs|Eijs = 1]
Following Helpman et al. (2008), I approximate (40) by a polynomial to the order




ijs. Then E[ψijs|Eijs = 1] = d0 +
d1E[zijs|Eijs = 1] + d2E[z2ijs|Eijs = 1] + d3E[z3ijs|Eijs = 1].
Because zijs is subject to a normal distribution, E[zijs|Eijs = 1], E[z2ijs|Eijs = 1]
and E[z3ijs|Eijs = 1] are actually moments of a truncated normal distribution. Using
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the arithmetic of Dhrymes (2005), they can be calculated as follows:
E[zijs|Eijs = 1] = ẑijs + σvu∗ijs,
E[z2ijs|Eijs = 1] = ẑ2ijs + σvẑijsu∗ijs + σ2v ,
E[z3ijs|Eijs = 1] = ẑ3ijs + σvẑ2ijsu∗ijs + 3σ2v ẑijs + 2σ3vu∗ijs,
where ẑijs = σvΦ













ijs. I then write this equation as: E[ψijs|Eijs =














# Country # Country # Country
1 Albania * 53 Ghana 105 Pakistan
2 Algeria 54 Greece * † 106 Panama
3 Angola 55 Guatemala 107 Paraguay *†
4 Argentina *† 56 Guinea * 108 Peru *
5 Armenia 57 Guinea-Bissau 109 Poland *†
6 Australia *† 58 Guyana 110 Portugal *†
7 Austria *† 59 Haiti 111 Qatar
8 Azerbaijan * 60 Honduras 112 Republic of Congo
9 Bahrain 61 Hong Kong * 113 Romania *
10 Bangladesh * 62 Hungary *† 114 Russia *
11 Barbados 63 Iceland * 115 Rwanda
12 Belarus 64 India * 116 Saudi Arabia
13 Belgium † 65 Indonesia *† 117 Senegal *
14 Belize 66 Iran 118 Sierra Leone
15 Benin 67 Ireland *† 119 Singapore *
16 Bolivia *† 68 Israel * 120 Slovakia *†
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina 69 Italy *† 121 Slovenia *†
18 Botswana 70 Jamaica 122 South Africa *
19 Brazil *† 71 Japan *† 123 South Korea *
20 Bulgaria * 72 Jordan * 124 Spain *†
21 Burkina Faso * 73 Kazakhstan 125 Sri Lanka
22 Burundi 74 Kenya 126 Suriname
23 Cambodia 75 Kuwait 127 Swaziland
24 Cameroon 76 Kyrgyz Republic 128 Sweden *†
25 Canada *† 77 Laos 129 Switzerland *†
26 Cape Verde 78 Latvia *† 130 Syria
27 Central African Rep.* 79 Lebanon 131 Taiwan
28 Chad 80 Lesotho 132 Tajikistan
29 Chile *† 81 Libya 133 Tanzania
30 China *† 82 Lithuania *† 134 Thailand *
31 Colombia *† 83 Luxembourg † 135 The Bahamas
32 Costa Rica † 84 Macedonia * 136 The Gambia
33 Cote d’Ivoire * 85 Madagascar * 137 The Netherlands *†
34 Croatia * 86 Malawi * 138 The Philippines *†
35 Cuba † 87 Malaysia * 139 Togo *
36 Cyprus † 88 Mali * 140 Trinidad and Tobago
37 Czech Republic *† 89 Malta † 141 Tunisia *
38 Denmark *† 90 Mauritania 142 Turkey *
39 Djibouti 91 Mauritius * 143 Turkmenistan
40 Dominican Republic † 92 Mexico *† 144 Uganda *
41 Ecuador *† 93 Moldova * 145 Ukraine *
42 Egypt * 94 Mongolia * 146 United Arab Emirates
43 El Salvador 95 Morocco * 147 United Kingdom *†
44 Equatorial Guinea 96 Mozambique 148 United States *†
45 Estonia *† 97 Namibia 149 Uruguay *†
46 Ethiopia * 98 Nepal 150 Uzbekistan
47 Fiji 99 New Zealand *† 151 Venezuela *
48 Finland *† 100 Nicaragua 152 Vietnam
49 France *† 101 Niger 153 Yemen
50 Gabon 102 Nigeria † 154 Zambia *
51 Georgia * 103 Norway * 155 Zimbabwe
52 Germany *† 104 Oman *
Note: The countries in this table are the sample of importing countries in the extensive analysis. Besides, the
countries marked by * are the sample of exporting countries in the extensive as well as intensive analyses. The
countries marked by † are the sample of importing countries in the intensive analysis.
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